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of the
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LEWIS F. HANSEN, \Y. Y. JENSEN,
MRS. J. E. JENSEN, RALPH CUTLER, HETTIE ~IAY BATES and
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GRANITE HOLDING COMPANY, a
corporation, NEPHI J. HANSEN
and WILLIAM L. HANSEN,
Ap,pella!nts and Defendants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT,
WILLIAM L. HANSEN

This case is an appeal from a judgment and decree
made and entered by the District Court of Salt Lake
County, Judge A. H. Ellett, December 24, 1948, setting
aside a deed from the Granite Holding Company, one
of the defendants, to William L. Hansen, another of the
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defendants, and dated July 16, 1945, (T. 112). The
judgment also awarded the Granite Holding Company
judgment in the sum of $29,246.05 against William L.
Hansen. In stating the facts we shall divide the statement into three parts: I. The Pleadings and the Parties;
II. 'The Testimony, (A) The Validity of the Deed, (B)
The Accounting; III. The Findings, Conclusions and
Judgment of the Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
FOREWORD
We attempted to summarize the evidence into a more
concise statement than follows in this brief. We abandoned the effort, howev•er, because it was not possible
to make a more brief summary and at the same time
present clearly to this court the utter lack of support
in the evidence for the findings of fact, conclusions of
law and judgment herein. Our research has failed to
disclose one single authority to support the trial court
in this case, and a less complete summary of the evidence
than we have given herein might lead this court to wonder if we had not omitted to state some of the evidence.
Therefore, we concluded to attempt to state the substance of the evidence of every witness. We have also
set forth as briefly as possible the substance of the
pleadings and the court's findings, conclusions and judgment. We hope that this will give in the pages of this
brief a complete picture of the record to each member
of the court.
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I.

THE PLEADINGS AND THE PARTIES

The identity of the parties and the dates of the
pleadings have a rna terial place in this action. The action is one in equity and was commenced by Lewis F.
Hansen and Clyde Hansen as plaintiff's against the defendants by a complaint filed December 21, 1946, and
summons served December 23, 1946, (T. 1-9). The complaint in substance alleges that the plaintiffs are stockholders of the defendant corporation and "bring this
action for and in behalf of said corporation'' and for
themselves and other stockholders who are interested
and desire to join and share the costs; that the defendant, Nephi Hansen, since and prior to 1928 has presumed to act as the president and general manager and
director of the corporation, and that since said time no
legal or regular meetings of stockholders or directors
of said corporation have been held and ''no one has
been legally authorized to manage or direct the affairs
and business of said corporation, and the defendant,
Nephi J. Hansen, has presumed to use the corporation
and its property for his own interest and benefit''; that
the corporation has failed to keep books and records ;
that the stock of the corporation is divided into 3500
shares of common and 3500 shares of preferred stock
with cumulative dividends for the preferred stock; that
in 1919 a new board of directors was established and
that of this board all but three of the directors are dead,
and that those three are the defendant, Nephi J. Hansen, and the plaintiffs, Clyde Hansen and Lewis F. IIanSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

sen, and that for a number of years last past there has
been no legally constituted board of directors; that the
corporation for many years has heen the owner and entitled to the possession of certain property, describing
it, (this property is situated at the southwest corner
of 11th East and 21st 'South in Salt Lake City) ; that the
said property has been producing substantial rental
income but plaintiffs cannot state the amount, and on
information and belief state that it is in excess of
$2500.00 per month; that plaintiffs have no knowledge
as to the handling and disposition of the income but
allege on information and belief that the corporation is
insolvent or in danger of insolvency, and that the assets
and property have been and are now being dissipated,
and the corporation is unable to pay its obligations or
protect the investment of the stockholders unless the
court appoints a receiver.
The complaint then alleges that on or about the
16th day of July, 1945, a deed to the abov.e described
property was made, executed, delivered and recorded
in the office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County,
purporting to convey the property from the defendant
corporation to the defendant, William L. Hansen, for a
purported consideration of $10,000.00; that the deed
was not authorized or executed by the corporation pursuant to resolution of the board of directors and without authority of the board of directors or the stockholders or any authority of the company or its officers or
stockholders to the president of the corporation or any
other officer to sell or dispose of the property, and that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the property is all of the assets of the corporation; that
the consideration ·was grossl~· inadequate; that the property was worth in excess of $200,000.00, and that the consideration of $10,000.00 'Yas not fully paid h~· the defendant, "~illimn L. Hansen, and the corporation never did
receive the n1oney therefor. These allegations are upon
information and belief. Continuing·, the cmnplaint alleges
that the defendant, Nephi Hansen, is in practical control of the corporation and dominates its affairs, and
that an appeal to the corporation to protect the stockholders would be futile and useless. The complaint then
asks for the appointment of a receiver; that the court
enter a decree adjudging the def-endant corporation to
be the owner of the aforesaid property clear of any
claims of defendant, William L. Hansen; that defendants, ~ ephi Hansen and William Hans·en, be required
to render an accounting in favor of the corporation, and
for general relief.
Clyde Hansen was joined as a plaintiff without his
authority and approval and his name was stricken as a
plaintiff April 21, 1947, (T. 22), when the demurrers to
the complaint came on for hearing.
An amended complaint was filed August 14, 1947,
(T. 26-32), at which time more than two years after the
deed was given, the court permitted to be added as plaintiffs W. V. Jensen, Mrs. J. E. Jensen, Ralph Cutler,
Hettie May Bates and Rohert Young, (T. 23). The
amended complaint alleged essentially the same matters
as the original complaint and also. that Nephi J. Hansen
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controlled the corporation, failed to call stockholders'
meetings, prevented the holding of stockholders' and directors' meetings, and that year after year he represented to the stockholders that there were no items of
business exce'pt the liquidation of the mortgage indebtedness, ''and that by his said representations said defendant discouraged inquiry into the affairs of the corpo:·ntion and lulled the stockholders into inaction''; that
Nephi Hansen since 1928 has presumed to make all the
decisions and do all of the corporate acts; that he ltas
not kept any records, and that since 1928 he has treated
the corporation as his individual property, that in 1919
the articles of incorporation required the establishment
of a sinking fund, but that no such fund has ever been
established for the retirement of preferred stock, and
that no dividends have ever been paid since shortly
after 1919 ; that during all of said years Nephi Hansen
has failed to consult any other directors or hold directors' m·eetings or ''to permit vacancies to be filled on
the board of directors'' ; that Nephi Hansen had repeatedly told the preferred stockholders that dividends
could not be paid, and that he was liquidating the real
properties of the corporation, and that he has failed
and neglected during ·all the years to furnish the stockholders with any information; that two years prior to
the commencement of this action Nephi Hansen informed
the plaintiff, Lewis F. Hansen, that it would be wis·e to
sell the property, and that he sold the property to defendant, William L. Hansen, for $10,000.00 by deed in
the name of the corporation, and that that was an atSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ten1pted disposition of all of the ass·ets of the corporation, and that during the period Nephi Hansen advised
the stockholders that a sale was being negotiated. The
amended complaint asked for the same reli·ef as the
original complaint.
The complaint and amended complaint with Clyde
Hansen eliminated, thus in substance allege: 1. That
plaintiffs are stockholders of the defendant, Granite
Holding Company, and that plaintiff, Lewis F. Hansen,
since 1919 has been and at the time of the transaction
complained of was a director; that no dividends have
been paid for a period of more than twenty years; that
during all that time Nephi Hansen has operated the
corporation as his own property, given the stockholders
no information, liquidated its properties without their
consent and approval, and advised the stockholders that
he was doing so, held no directors' meetings and conducted the business of the Granite Holding Company as
he personally saw fit. 2. That on or about July 16, 1945,
he gave a deed in the name of the Granite Holding Company to defendant, William L. Hansen, his son, for a
recited consideration of $10,000.00 for the property in
question at 11th East and 21st South, the last remaining
asset of the corporation. Based upon such allegations
the plaintiff asked that the deed be set aside and the property declared to be that of the Granite Holding Company, and that the defendants Hansen account to the
Granite Holding Company. There is no offer or tender
on the part of the plaintiffs to do equity or to return
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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any consideration received by the corporation to William L. Hansen.
Defendants demurred to both complaints, particularly on the ground that the complaints show upon their face
that all the plaintiffs are estopped to secure the relief
prayed for; that there is no offer or tender to do equity;
that the plaintiffs have acquiesced in the acts of Nephi
J. Hansen for upwards of twenty-five years, and that the
complaints themselves do not show or allege that $10,000.00 was the actual consideration because the complaints show that there was a mortgage upon the property and do not recite the amount of the mortgage.
The defendant, William L. Hansen, also at the beginning
of the trial objected to the plaintiffs proceeding at all
upon the grounds that the action actually is one by the
corporation to rescind its deed, and the complaint shows
upon its face that the corporation received $10,000.00
in addition to an assumption of its mortgage by William
L. Hansen, and is making no offer or tender to return
what it received, ('T. 142, 143), and that the complaint
affirmatively sets forth allegations which show an ·esto1J'"
pel against the corporation and the stockholders so far
as William L. Hansen is concerned. This defendant also
asked for a non-suit at the close of plaintiffs' case, (T.
359).
At the beginning of the case the court asked counsel
for the plaintiffs if they were in a position to make a
tender.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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":J[R. JEX~K~r: \Yell, l nm not in a po:::;ition to
answer that question right now.

'"THE COURT: If you are not in position to do
it, there wouldn't be any need of taking a lot
of other evidence and finally come around to
the si tnation where you would have to make
your tender in order to get this thing set
aside.
'' ~IR. JONES: In view of the statement that
counsel just made to Your Honor, I renew
the motion I made.
''THE COURT: Well, I'll take care of that later.
I have ruled on that motion heretofore at this
stage, and you may proceed, Mr. Jensen.''
(T. 151, 152).
During this same episode efforts were made to get
Mr. Jensen to admit or deny that he was the attorney for
the plaintiff, nfr. Cutler, which question he evaded by
refusing to answer directly as to Mr. Cutler and replied:
"I represent all the plaintiffs", (T. 151, 152).
The answers and amended answers deny that the
plaintiffs, W. V. Jensen and Mrs. J. E. Jensen, are stockholders, assert that the Granite Holding Company is improperly joined as a defendant; that full consideration
was paid by William L. Hansen for the property; that
the stockholders of defendant corporation for years acquiesced in the management of the corporation by Nephi
Hansen, and they are ·estopped to assert any lack of
authority, and that they held out to the public generally
and to this defendant that they were not concerned or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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interested in the corporation or in its business or affairs,
and that Nephi Hansen had absolute authority to act on
behalf of the corporation including the right to sell and
mortgage its real property; that the defendant corporation represented to defendant William L. Hansen that
there was a regularly constituted de jure board of directors properly selected and qualified, and that they
unanimously adopted a resolution authorizing the sale
to the defendant of the property, and that the property
was sold to the defendant, William L. Hansen, for
$10,000.00 cash and the assumption of a $75,000.00 mortgage; that the Granite Holding Company still retains
the money and has made no tender of it to the defendant, nor have the plaintiffs; that the property was in a
dilapidated and run down condition, and that defendant
has put in approximately $20,000.00 additional of his
own money, and that it will be necessary to expend
another $100,000.00 in order to make the property selfsupporting, (T. 54, et. seq.). The defendant, Granite
Holding Company, and Nephi J. Hansen also set up
that· the plaintiff, Lewis F. Hansen, was one of the directors who consummated the transaction; that W. V.
Jensen and Mrs. J. E. Jensen, plaintiffs, have only a
representative interest through J. E. Jensen, a director,
who participated in the transaction and voted affirmatively for the delivery of the deed; that the transaction
was regular, and that the plaintiffs are estopped to question the deed.
The amended complaint was signed with the name
of LeGrand Backman as one of the attorneys for the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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plaintiff~.

('T. 32). LeGrand Baclanan never was an attorney for plaintiffs, (T. 1±7, 148), and before the case
crune on for trial Lewis Hansen withdrew as a plaintiff
and Benjamin Spence withdrew as his attorney, and E. C.
J€nsen was entered as counsel for the plaintiffs, (T. 74,
75, 76). Prior to the trial defendants, Granite Holding
CDmpany, and Nephi J. Hansen, served notice that they
would ask to amend their answers so as to deny that the
plaintiffs as then constituted were stockholders in the
Granite Holding Company, (T. 78). During the trial
(June 22, 1948, three years after the deed) it appeared
that the plaintiff, Robert Young, had been dead for years
before the filing of the complaint, and that William S.
Young is the distributee of the stock of Robert Young,
(T. 274), and the complaint was thereupon amended during the trial to show William S. Young as a party plaintiff instead of Robert Young, (T. 280). Later on December 16, 1948, and after the trial was ended .J. R. Jensen
and W.

·v.

Jensen moved for an order dismissing them

as plaintiffs in the action, (T. 102), and on the same day
these persons were dismissed as plaintiffs, (T. 101).
The heading of the motion reciting the names of the
plaintiffs states Mrs. J. R. Jensen, whereas all the other
pleadings refer to her as Mrs. J. E. Jensen which is
correct. While the motion itself and the order of dismissal refer to some person named J. R. Jensen, there
never was any one in the case named J. R. Jensen. Apparently, counsel at that late date did not know who his
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
clients were, and as a matter of fact during the trial the
following occurred:
"MR. JENSEN, (counsel for plaintiffs): Your
honor, I notice that the complaint, or the
amended complaint, rather, which I didn't
draw, for the record, shows Robert Young as
a plaintiff. Of course, Robert Young is dead,
and I don't think that is proper plaintiff.
Dead man can't sue.
''THE COURT: Wbich one of these men hired
you.
"MR. JONES:
weather.

These plaintiffs are like the

"MR. JENSEN: I refuse to answer." ( R. 279).
So of the two original plaintiffs who started the
action one was joined without his authority and withdrew immediately, while the other was a director who
affirmatively approved the deed in question. The later
plaintiffs, two of them, W. V. Jensen and Mrs. J. E.
Jensen, were not stockholders at all and one was the son
and the other the wife of the director J. E. Jensen who
voted for the deed is question. These two were apparently later dismissed as plaintiffs, while the plaintiff,
Robert Young, was dead and never did join as a plaintiff, and his son, William S. Young, was substituted during the trial. The plaintiffs were in a constant state
of flux, joining and then withdrawing, some with no capacity whatever, others affirmative participants in the conveyance of the property sought by such participants to
be voided on the ground of alleged fraud which they
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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themselYes had perpetrated. "Then the action was finished, none of the original plaintiffs remained, neither of
the attorneys who sig-ned the complaint were in the case,
those who started the action had disappeared, and it was
carried on by others who entered the picture nearly three
years after the deed had been given and the property
transferred, (T. 7-1:). Plaintiffs never did bring the case
on for trial. All they did was file a harassing action and
let it rest there. The case was brought on for trial only
upon motion and demand of the defendant, Granite
Holding Company. (T. 52). Tt may be that plaintiffs
were unable to determine who they were or who was
their attorney, they were in and out and shifting around
so frequently.
II.

THE TESTIMONY

PLAINTIFF's WITNESSES

(A l

The Validity of the Deed

The plaintiffs offered in evidence the Clerk's file of
the original articles and the various amendments and
oaths of office of the defendant, Granite Holding Company, (Exhibit "A", T. 144). These articles show that
originally the company was called the Granite Lumber
Company at the time of its incorporation in 1901; that
the name was changed to Granite Holding Company in
1927. Originally the corporation had 200 shares of the
par value of $100.00 each. Nephi J. Hansen, the defendant herein, and Joseph E. Jensen, one of the directors
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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'who authorized the deed to the defendant, W. L. Hansen,
were two of the five original incorporators in 1901 and
apparently continued as directors during the entire period under consideration up to 1945. The articles were
amended in 1919 to provide for 3500 shares of common
stock and 3500 shares of preferred stock. Nephi J. Hansen was then president of the company. In 1927 thc>
articles were amended, as above indicated, to change the
name to Granite Holding Company, and at that time
under the required "Statement of Domestic Corpo.:.·ation" the corporation represented that Nephi J. Hansen
was the president and general manager, Joseph E. Jensen, the vice-president, and Clyde Hansen the treasurer,
and that at that time all of the common stock, to-wit, 3500
shares and 740 shares of the preferred stock were subscribed and apparently issued. Only in the event dividends on the preferred stock were not paid for three consecutive years did the preferred stock have any voting
power and then only one vote for each share of stock.
In 1932 the State of Utah forfeited the charter of the
corporation for non-payment of license taxes.
From the beginning the articles have provided by
article 9 that there shall he a general manager appointed
by the board of directors to hold his position at the pleasure of the hoard, and by article 12 that the board of
directors in their discretion ''and without notice to or
authority from the stockholders" shall have power "to
sell, mortgage, exchange, assign or dispose of, in any
way or n1anner they may deem best, any or all the real
and personal property of the corporation.'' Article 11
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has always provided that the board of directors are
authorized to fill all vacancies in the board of directors
occurring from any cause whatever, and that any director including the persons so appointed shall serve
until the next annual election and until his successor is
elected and qualified.
The plaintiffs produced ten witnesses, six of whom
were stockholders-Hettie ~fay Bates, Clyde F. Hansen,
:Mary Hansen Southwick, William S. Young, Ralph Cutler and Lewis F. Hansen. Keith Bates, a son of Hettie
:Jiay Bates, also testified, apparently as the representative of his mother.
~Irs. Bates testified that she is the owner of 50
shares of the preferred stock, issued to her in 1921,
(Exhibit "B", T. 149), and that she is the widow of
Ephraim Bates, who was the owner of 55 shares of preferred stock, (Exhibit "C", T. 150). There is no way
of determining whether or not she is the owner of the
55 shares, Exhibit "C ", except her conclusion and no
way of determining when the endorsement on the back
of the shares was made. We objected to the introduction
of Exhibit "C", and it was received over our objection,
('T. 153). It should not be considered.

Mrs. Bates testified that she had never received any
reports or information at all about the condition or
affairs of the company at any time since she has been a
stockholder; that she never had notice of meetings, and
that she never knew anything about any sale or proposed sale of the property at 21st South and Hyland
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Drive (11th East) ; that it was just recently that she
learned that it had been sold, and that was about a year
ago. She learned of it from Mr. Vivian Jensen. She has
never had any information with respect to the financial
condition of the defendant corporation or of any of its
properties, nor of any change in directors, nor any information of any kind, nature or description with I'Cspect to any of the affairs of Granite Holding Company
since 1921, ( T. 155), although she has resided in Salt
Lake City all of the time and has had the same address
since 1923. Her husband, Ephraim Bates, the record
owner of Exhibit "C", died 17 years ago, (T. 155, 156).
She has known Nephi J. Hansen personally, but only on
one occasion since she got her stock has she ever spoken
to Mr. Hansen. The stock she has was given to her by
her husband. Hhe never knew any of the officers or directors of the company. She knew the company was
located in Sugarhouse, but she didn't know what it did
nor what property it owned, nor what business it was
engaged in, and never knew anything about it at all,
(T. 157, 158). The only persons she ever inquired about
concerning the company was from Mr. Rob Young
after her husband died, but she can't remember what the
inquiry was about, and D. E. Judd, here brother-in-law,
of the Utah Savings & Trust, (T. 160). She never went
to the company's place of business and never communicated with the company, never attended a stockholders'
meeting, never knew anything about the affairs of the
company, and never tried to find out anything from
the company itself about its affairs, and never proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tested to any officers of the company about her lack of
inforn1ation or notice of meetings or the conduct of the
business of the company. There was nothing so far as
she knew that was any different in the sale in 1945 than
in other sales of property that had been 1nade. She knew
Xephi Hansen and she tmderstood that he was the owner
of Granite Holding Company. She never asked Mr.
Hansen anything about the company, (T. 161, 162). :Mr.
Vivian Jensen is the one ·who solicited her to be a
plaintiff in this action. She doesn't know whether or not
the property was about to be sold or whether it had
been sold. She didn't tell him to file suit. He and her
son, Keith, went ahead and made her a party, but she
was willing for them to do so, (T. 164). She received
dividends for two or three years, but for at least the last
17 years has never received nor made any inquiry.
She was told that the company was bankrupt and she
couldn't get anything. Her brother told her this, ( T.
167). The only other stockholders she talked to about
the company was Mr. Rob Young, and he didn't seem
to know much about it, (T. 168, 169).
Keith Bates, son of the foregoing witness, testified
that in May of 1947, nearly two years after W. L. Hansen
took over the property, a meeting of the stockholders
whom they could locate was held in the home of Vivian
Jensen in Salt Lake City. Clyde Hansen was there, and
L. F. Hansen, both of whom he understood to be directors of Granite Holding Company, (T. 170). 'They
asked if the sale of the property in question had been
made and they stated it had; that the consideration was
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$8500.00 or $10,000.00 which had been paid to the corporation cr. 173). Clyde stated that he didn't know wha;t
was done with the money. L. F. Hansen didn't say anything, (T. 176). Clyde told them that they were off on
the wrong track, there was nothing there ( T. 177). Vivian
Jensen called the meeting, and his mother authorized
him to act in her name. This was the first time he had
heard about the sale of the property. He knew his mother
had been a stockholder for years, (T. 178), and that he
had heard rumors of other sales. He knows nothing about
the other sales, ( T. 178, 179).
Clyde F. Hansen testified that he was the secretary
and director of Granite Holding Company until January
12, 1948. He was secr·etary and director on July 18, 1945
and had been a director since 1924. Nephi J. Hansen
is his father and president of the Granite Holding Company. Laura F. Hansen is his mother, and she was a
director of the Granite Holding Company at the time the
sale was made. Mary H. Southwick is his sister, and she
was a director at the time the sale was made. L. F. Hansen, plaintiff, is his brother and he was a director at
the time the sale was made. Hooper Knowlton, another
director, is a real estate man in Sugarhouse. He is
around forty years old, and is a tenant of his fathers
and is in business in Sugarhouse. Joseph E. Jensen was
a director and a resident of Sugarhouse, and he is now
dead. He died about two years ago, and he was an
employee of his father right from the time the business
was started, (T. 181, 182). There were several meetings
of the directors at the company office around July 18,
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19-±5. He wrote the 1ninutes of the 1neeting of July 18th
(T. 181. 182). These minutes are Exhibit 'D", (T. 183),
which was received in evidence, (T. 200). These minutes
are as follows:
•' :JfiNP'TES OF THg l\I E~ETING
OF
DIRECTORS OF
GRANITE HOLDING

CO~IP ANY

''A meeting of the Board of Directors of
Granite Holding Company was held July 18, 1945,
at 6:00 P ..M. at the office of the company, 2108
South 11th East, Salt Lake City, after due notice
and upon call of the president.
''All members of the board, there being only
four, were present, the same being Nephi J. Hansen, president and director; Clyde F. Hansen,
secretary and director; L. F. Hansen, director,
and Joseph E. Jensen, director. President Hansen presided and Secretary Hansen acted as
secretary of the meeting.
"The president announced that the purpose
of the meeting was to fill vacancies in the Board
of Directors. Thereupon, upon motion of Director Nephi J. Hansen, seconded by Director
Clyde F. Hansen, the following persons were
elected and appointed to the office of director
to hold office until the next annual election or
until their successors are elected and qualified;
Hooper Knowlton, Mary H. Southwick, and Laura
F. Hansen. All directors thereupon signed the
oath of office and were declared directors of the
company, including those newly elected.
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''The president announced the purpose of the
meeting was to dispose of the company's property, consisting of the real estate and buildings
located at 21st South and 11th East (Highland
Drive), Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to the existing mortgage in favor of the Beneficial Life Insurance Company. President Hansen stated that
the company had an opportunity to realize the
substantial amount of approximately $10,000.00
for said property over and above the mortgage.
The president gave a brief history of operations
since the depression, and stated that all stores
between the Granite Mart and the Theatre building had been sold to reduce the mortgage.
''After a discussion upon motion of Director
Hooper Knowlton, seconded by Director Laura
F. Hansen, the following resolution was unanimously adopted:
"RESOLVED, That the company's property
at 21st South and 11th East (Highland Drive),
Salt Lake City, Utah, consisting of all of its real
estate and buildings at said location, be sold subject to the existing mortgage in favor of Beneficial Life Insurance Company for not less than
$10,000.00 over and above the present amount due
on the mortgage, taxes to be prorated as of date
of deed, and that the president and secretary be
authorized to issue warranty deed as aforesaid
to the purchaser and to receive payment therefor,
the amount of the company's taxes, the revenue
stamps, and legal expenses, to be deducted from
and credited upon the amount to be received for
the property.
''AND BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED,
That $5,000.00 be paid to President Nephi J. Hansen in full for back salary heretofore authorized
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by the Board of Directors but never paid to or
collected by President Hansen, and that said
sum be deducted frmn the amount received upon
the purchase of said property.
''There being no further business to perform,
upon motion duly made and seconded the meeting
adjourned.''
(s) CLYDE F. HANSEN
8 ecretary an.d Director
GRANITE HOLDING CO:MPANY
(s) NEPHI J. HANSEN
President and Director
(s) HOOPER KNOWLTON
Director

(s) LAURA F. HANSEN
{s) JOSEPH E. JENSEN
Directo.r

(s) :JIARY H. SOUTHWICK
D1irector
(s) L. F. HANSEN
Director

There were several meetings held just about that time
and prior to that within about a month, but prior to
that there hadn't been any meetings for a long time, (T.
183). At the time of this meeting there were several
vacancies in the board. The first thing done was to fill
the vacancies. The directors present before the vacancies were Nephi J. Hansen, Clyde F. Hansen, Lewis F.
Hansen and Joseph E. Jensen, and at that meeting there
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were added to the board Hooper Knowlton, Mary H.
Southwick and Laura F. Hansen, who executed their
oaths of office at that time, ( T. 184). There was no one
present besides these seven directors. Mr. Rawlings
was not there. Mr. Jones was not there, nor was William
L. Hansen there. William L. Hansen never was present
at any directors' meetings (T. 419). At that time the
company was the owner of the property at the southwest corner of 21st South and Highland Drive. (T. 184,
185). On the ground floor are located n1any store rooms,
and it is a two-story building in the main building where
a number of apartments are located, something around
24, ( T. 186, 187). There was a mortgage on the property
of around $74,500.00 with the Beneficial Life Insurance
Company which as near as he can remember originally
was for $82,500.00 in 1941 after the sale of some other
parcels of property that the mortgage had formerly
covered, (T. 187). Previously the Granite Holding Company had owned all the property now held by the Southeast Furniture Company, and also owned the property
on 21st South now owned by the Granite Mart and west
of the property in question, and those properties were
sold off and arrangements were made with the Beneficial
for partial releas·es, and the mortgages in that way
dropped down, ( T. 187, 188). There were no books or
records of the company under his supervision. The
records had all been lost before he became secretary.
He had no books and records. The company had some
income by way of rentals, but the company had no payroll, (T. 189). He signed the deed to William L. Hansen
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as secretary of the company. Whenever property was
transferred that's about the only time he came into the
picture to sign as the secretary. He had signed as
serretary for other transfers before the one in question,
(T. 190).
After the election of the additional directors in July
1~)-t-:l, the director~ proceeded with the business of the sale
of property in question which was all of the remaining
property of the Granite Holding Cmnpany to \Yilliam L.
Hansen. He had previously talked to William L. Hansen about the sale and to his father on numerous occasions. This was not the first time that the matter had
been brought to the attention of the board of directors.
He had talked to the board on previous occasions, that is
the four people who were then directors. He signed the
minutes which contained a resolution authorizing him
as secretary and the president as president to execute
a deed for the sale of this property. Everyone knew that
the purchaser was William L. Hansen, although anybody
could have bought it then, and they asked Nephi J. Hansen to see if there was a possibility of other sales, and
he reported that there wasn't and this was the best
deal he could get. William L. Hansen was the only person interested in the purchase of that property, (T. 193).
He doesn't recall the date the deed was executed, although the date, July 16, appears on the deed which was
not recorded until July 28. It contains the signature of
his father as president and acknowledgment before
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24

Hooper Knowlton that it was executed on July 16, (T.
194). He doesn't remember the deal as having been consummated that way, that is the deed on the 16th and the
meeting on the 18th, (T. 195). (Later Mr. Clyde Hansen
testified that the date of either the deed or resolution
was wrong because the deed was signed after the board
had adopted the resolution, ( T. 285). tSo there must be
a mistake in the deed, (T. 287). The resolution recites
that $5,000.00 of the $10,000.00 was to be paid to Nephi
J. Hansen as back salary.) (No one disputed and there is
nothing in the record that this was not a just debt of
the company to Nephi Hansen). The board took his
father's statement that the company owed him that
much, and he, the witness, knew what his father had been
getting and what the board of directors had formerly
authorized him to take. 'The other $5,000.00 he doesn't
know definitely what became of it, although he knows
part of it went for expenses and taxes which had to be
taken care of. The deal contemplated the proration of
the taxes between the buyer and the seller, (T. 196, 199).
(Exhibit 5 shows that none of the second $5,000.00 went
for taxes). His father made all the deposits which were
checked out on his father's signature, and always have
been. On his father's signature alone the money could
be checked out, ( T. 201).
Exhibit "E" is the deed transferring the property
from Granite Holding Company to William L. Hans·en,
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(T. 201). Exhibit ''E", elin1inating the description of
the property, reads as follows:
''"\YARRANTY DEED
"GR~~NITE HOLDING COlVfPANY, a Utah
corporation, grantor of Salt Lake City, County
of Salt Lake, State of Utah, hereby CONVEY'S
and "\V~~RRANTS to WILLIA~I L. HANSEN,
grantee of Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah, for the sum of TEN and noj100
($10.00) Dollars and other good and valuable consideration, the following described tract of land
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah:

* * * *
''Subject to a Renewal Mortgage in favor of Beneficial Life Insurance Company
dated November 1, 1941, recorded November
10, 1941 in the office of the County Recorder,
Salt Lake County, Book 292, Page 31.
'' 1945 Taxes to be prorated.
"WITNESS the hand of said grantor, this
16th day of July, A. D. 1945 by its proper officers
thereunto duly authorized.

ATTEST:

GRANITE HOLDING COMPANY
By N. J. HANSEN
Pr,esident

CLYDE F. HANSEN
Secretary
STATE OF UTAH,
COUN'TY OF SALT LAKE

)
) ss.
)

"On the 16th day of July, A. D. 1945 personally appeared before me Nephi J. Hansen and
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Clyde F. Hansen who being first duly sworn did
say: That they are the President and Secretary
respectively of Granite Holding Company, a corporation, and that said instrument was signed
in behalf of said corporation by authority of a
resolution of its Board of Directors and said
Nephi J. Hansen and Clyde F. Hansen aclmowledged to me that said corporation executed the
same.
HOOPER KNOWLTON
N-o t·ary Public
Residing at Salt Lake City,
Utah
(SEAL)
My Commission Expires:
February 28, 1948''
The signatures are those of his father and himself. The
deed shows it was recorded July 28, 1945.
The witness testified that he gave the minutes, Exhibit "D", to Mr. Jones, the attorney for William L.
Hansen, and at that time it was signed by all the directors ( T. 422). W. L. Hansen, as it will appear from
his testimony, got the deed from Clyde and then authorized Mr. Jones to pay the first $5,000 to Nephi Hansen
which was done upon receipt of the resolution, (T. 314).
There had been a meeting on July 11 at which the whole
proposition was discussed and decided, and there was a
meeting on the 16th when the same matter was discussed.
The minutes, Exhibit "D", were first taken in his own
handwriting in long-hand and then transcribed, and all
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matter was discussed. He doesn't remember when the
deed was delivered to ,V. L. Hansen, but it was sometime
a week or so after the date of it and after the meeting
of the board of directors and after it was signed.
The witness then identified Exhibit 1 which bears
the signatures of his father and Lon Fisher with which
he is familiar. and contains a resolution of the board of
directors of Granite Holding Company which has never
been rescinded. The exhibit was receiv·ed in evidence,
('T. 205). Exhibit 1 is the minutes of a special meeting
of the board of directors of Granite Holding Company
held ~Iay 15, 1939, at which all five directors were either
present or had executed waivers and consent for all business to be transacted. At that time the minutes recite
that the president reported on the condition of the property, and that it was desirable to liquidate as much of
the real estate as possible and apply the proceeds to the
Beneficial Life mortgage. A resolution was adopted that
the president and secretary be authorized "to proceed at
once to sell all or any part of the real property and
premises of this corporation, at either public or private
sale, upon the best terms obtainable, and they are hereby
authorized to make, execute and deliver any and all
necessary and proper deeds, contracts, and other instruments in order to consummate such sale on behalf of this
corporation, and any such sale made by them as herein
provided shall be final and binding upon this corporation.'' The resolution further provided that all proceeds
from any sales shall be applied on the mortgage of the
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Beneficial Life. After this resolution Granite Holding
Company sold property in Sugarhouse to the Southeast
Furniture Company which is the property next south
to the one in question. That property was the last building built, and the construction was better than it was
on any of the other buildings. The floor space would be
greater than the property sold to William L. Hansen.
An offer was made by counsel for defendant, William L.
Hansen, to show by this witness sales of all the remaining
property of the Granite Holding Company from a period
starting August 11, 1939, down to March 20, 1942, for the
exact amount of the mortgage, and that the Granite Holding Company received none of these sums except by way
of credit on the mortgage. This offer the court refused,
(T. 209).
The witness has been familiar with the property
of Granite Holding Company ever since 1923 or 1924,
and all that time his father has managed it, and he never
recalls a stockholders' meeting or a directors' meeting in
recent years except when necessary further to satisfy the
mortgage. His father handled the bank accounts, paid
the rent, paid the interest on the mortgage, and so far
as he knows there were never any inquiries by any stockholders over the years about the way the business was
run, (T. 210, 211). There were never any objections
about his father selling the property, and there were a
number of sales. The physical condition of the property
in question when it was sold to William L. Hansen was
bad. The buildings on the corner were built in 1900,
and it was a common occurrence for his father to have
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to pay for some stock that was ruined because of water
leaking and pipes breaking. The next building was built
in about 1916, and the third building was built a little
later. They were all very badly run down. The Granite
Holding Con1pany was in bad financial condition-the
payments on the mortgage were not kept up. The income
was not sufficient at all to keep up the expenses of
operating the property including the interest on the
mortgage. There wasn't any money to keep up the payments on the mortgage, (T. 212, 214).
At this point an episode occurred which indicated
to us that the trial court had already determined his decision in this case. The witness had stated that the company simply didn't have the money to keep up the pro-

perty. This was objected to, and the court made the following observation, ( T. 215) :
"THE COURT: I think the objection ought to
be sustained. I don't want to limit counsel in
getting information before me. Some inference might be had about irregularities in this
quick sale, filling vacancies, and so forth, and
I let some in, but this detail here doesn't interest me. I don't think it will help me any.
"l\IR ..JO~ES: Is Your Honor's ruling based
upon the ground of conclusion?
''THE COURT: All grounds stated by counsel.
"MR. JONES: If it is on the ground that it is
not proper cross examination, that is one
thing.
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"THE COURT: All ground~ ~·ou can think of
now and all grounds he can think of between
now and the end of the appeal, Mr .•Jones.
"~lR.

JONES: Because J intend to renew the
question in the nmin case because I don't
think it is a conclusion.

''THE COURT: As to why they didn't have
money enough or why they didn't pay that,
I don't care to hear nwre of that, if there is
any way to avoid it, and by seizing on his
objection I can at this time."
There had been no evidence and no inference can be
drawn from the evidence that there was a quick sale or
irregularities, and the court indicated he wasn't interested at all in why the company had to sell this property,
whether it was in financial distress or not, and that he
expected us to have to appeal from his decision.
"MR. JONES, (continuing),: Well, how long had
this deal been under consideration. The court
just made a statement about a quick sale.
How long had this deal been under consideration for the sale of this corner1
"A.:

About two months at least.

'''THE COURT: The statement I made, Mr.
Jones, was a quick sale after the appointment of the three additional directors.''
There was no quick sale after the appointment of the
three additional directors. The matter had been discussed for weeks.
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Plaintiffs next called the defendant, William L. Hansen, who testified that he was furnished· an operating
statement of the revenues and expense8 and financial
statement of the Granite Holding Con1pany for the years
1943, 1944 and 1945, and that his father made up these
statements. They were received in evidence as Exhibits
2, 3 and 4, (T. 216). These exhibits show that in 1943
with nothing allowed for depreciation or renovation
and payments on principal not fully met, the property
produced only $41.74 n1ore than the bare actual 'expenses; that in 1944 the revenue was $527.30 more than
the bare expenses, and in 1945 for the first four months
the revenue was $115.80 less than the bare expenses. So
for the 28 months in 1943, 1944 and 1945 the property'
produced $453.24 with no provision whatever for depreciation, replacement, renovations, and with constantly increasing deficiences on the mortgage payments. These
exhibits also show the names of the tenants, the dimensions of the property, and the date the buildings were
constructed, to-wit, 1900, 1907, 1909 and 1917. These
exhibits were offered and received without objection. It
appears from them that in the 28 months in 1943, 1944
and 1945, that the company paid in salaries for 1943
$1864.00, or approximately $155.00 a month; in 1944
$2266.00, or $188.00 a month; and in 1945 for the four
months $127 4.00 .a
it , or $318.00 or an average for
the period of $204.00 per month and a total amount for
salaries of $5404.12. It already appears that there was
no payroll, and Nephi Hansen was the only one receiving
anything from the corporation, and his salary, as we have
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thus shown, averaged $204.00 a nwnth. It appears thus
from the plaintiff's case that the company was paying a
management fee of $204.00 a month as the necessary expense under its own management. This is important in
considering the action of the court in refusing to allow
William L. Hansen anything paid his father or for his
own management and all the advantages that accrued to
the property as a result thereof.
Mr. W. L. Hansen further testified at a later time a~
a part of plaintiffs' case that early in 1945 he had a conversation with members of his family about the Foothills Development property, a different property than
the one in question, and that the Sugarhouse property
was mentioned only incidentally. The discussion was
with reference to dividing up the Foothill Development
property between Sid Mullcock and Lincoln Hansen and
the possibility of getting some of that property for the
family, ( T. 304, 305). At that time the witness made a
suggestion to his brother, Lew, (plaintiff, L. F. Hansen),
that L·ew go down to Sugarhouse and spend a little time
and see what could he worked out with respect to the
Sugarhouse property, which Lew did. Lew reported
back that there was no value in the Sugarhouse property,
and he would much prefer th~ .. Foothills Development
property, (T. 306, 307). Witness was also interested
in securing a part of the Foothills Development property.
His father sugges~d that he, the witness, do something
about the Sugarhouse property, and that he buy it.
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The witness got the deed to the Sugarhouse property. but it was not until after the sale, when he saw
the Ininutes. that he lmderstood that his father got
$5,000.00 of the purchase price of the Sugarhouse property, (T. 308). ~lfter the sale he was shown the minutes
which had been approved, but he had no such understanding prior to that time. His only understanding
about his father prior to the sale was that he would try
to put the property upon a paying basis, and if he
could, he would give his father a job. As far as the allocation of the down payment, he had nothing to do with
it. The original check for $5,000.00 was given at the time
of the delivery of the deed, and he had no understanding whatsoever with regard to the operation of the Granite Holding Company or anything about the $5,000.00
down payment. He knew nothing about the action of
the board of directors, ('T. 309). All he knew about the
financial condition of the company were the statements
up to "Jiay of 1945, which had been made up from the
check stubs in his father's possession and with his
father's help. There was no talk then of the purchase of
the property, (T. 310). He regarded the Granite Holding
Company as his father's company, and the Sugarhouse
property was the last of the properties Granite Holding
Company had accumulated in all the years in Sugarhouse. His father built the company, and it was his understanding that he owned most of the stock. He felt free to
deal with his father with respect to the property if the
same was approved by a resoll!ti_on 9f the board of directors, ( T. 311). When the deed was delivered, he gave the
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check for $5,000.00 but did not get a copy of the resolution at that time. He did not receive the deed and did not
have possession of the deed until the day it was recorded.
He recorded thP deed the same day. The check is Exhibit
"G'' and is dated July 27, 1945, to Granite Holding Company for $5,000.00, and is endorsed Granite Holding
Company. He delivered the check to Mr. Jones who delivered it to Nephi Hansen, (T. 312, 314). The deed was
delivered to the witness from the secretary of the company, Clyde F. Hansen, and the witness notified Mr.
Jones to deliver the check. At that time he had not
seen the resolution, but he insisted upon a resolution of
the board of directors. He assumed that the board of
directors had been filled, but he had no idea who was
going on the board, and he didn't talk to his father about
filling up the board except that it would be necessary to
have a complete board, (T. 316, 318). The endorsement
on the back of Exhibit "G", the check, looks like his
father's. The check cleared through the witness's account in the Yellowstone Banking Company, and he
parted with the money represented by it which was
actually paid to the company, and he knows nothing about
where it went afterwards. Exhibit" G" was received and
offered in evidence, (T. 320). Witness paid another
$5,000.00, and since he went into the property he spent
better than $14,000.00 more of his own money and about
three years of work for which he has taken nothing,
(T. 320). Exhibit~n!ijied by the witness which
is a check for the
·
r\5,000.00 of the purchase
price, dated December 26, 1945, and to which is attached
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a staten1ent of Decen1ber 28, 1945, being a receipt from
Granite Holding Company for the purchase price in
fnll, and fr01n the second $5,000.00 are deducted items
which "\Y. L. Hansen had paid which were the obligations of the Granite Holding Company in the amount
of $1219.76. Nothing frmn the purchase price was applied to payment of taxes, the taxes having already been
set aside by the Beneficial Life from the payments made
on the mortgage by the Granite Holding Company. The
second check is for $3,780.24 which with the $1,219.76 already paid by W. L. Hansen makes the total of $5,000.00.
This check is also endorsed Granite Holding Company
in his father's handwriting. The check cleared through
his bank account at Sugarhouse and came out of his
funds, and he parted with the full $5,000.00, and he
received no return of cash from either payment, (T. 321,
322). Exhibit 5 is also endorsed Granite Holding Company and initialed "N.J. H." in, he thinks, his father's
handwriting, (T. 323). He is not familiar with the
Granite Holding Company. The exhibit 5 was received
in evidence, (T. 324). He had nothing to do with filling
the board of directors of the Granite Holding Company.
He has never been a stockholder or a director of the
Granite Holding Company or had anything whatsoever
to do with it. He paid everything he thought the property
was worth, and the Exhibits 2, 3 and 4 represent to the
best of his ability the information as to the actual income
and expenses of the property before he bought it, (T.
325).
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W. L. Hansen also testified later that he was
never at any meeting at his father's house when he made
the statement that all he wanted was to save the property for the family. He never made any such statement, nor was he at any n1eeting of the family when
Lew said that he (Lew) wanted to save the property
for the stockholders. ''Lew has never been interested
in saving for the stockholders.'' He was never present
on any occasion when Lew ever protested his purchase
of the property, (T. 433, 434).
Mary Hansen Southwick was called by the plaintiffs
and testified that she is the daughter of Nephi Hansen
and that she attended several meetings; that she signed
Exhibit '' D''; that she acted as a director because her
father requested her to; that she was a director and
had a share of stock. She assumes that it came from her
father as her father owned most of the stock of the
corporation. She recalls the occasion when the matter
of the sale of the property to William was discussed
which she had heard of prior to that time. There were
two or three meetings. Her father was getting along
towards 80. They were worried about him and felt
that he had too much to carry and something ought to
be done to relieve him, (T. 262). She knew that they
were considering selling the property to William; that
her father was having a time paying the mortgage and
interest, and that he needed help. She doesn't remember
whether her mother was at the meeting or not, but she
would recognize her mother's signature if she would
see it. The sale of the property was discussed with
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her nwther. Her n1emory is indistinct because she didn't
have any occasion to remember any of these matters.
She never thought that any of these matters would be
questioned, ( T. 263, 26-!).
Willian1 S. Young testified that he is the son of
Robert Young, named as a plaintiff, who in his lifetime
was a stockholder of Granite Holding Company, and
that he, the witness, is now the owner of Robert Young's
stock by virtue of a decree of distribution; that said
stock amounts to 45 shares of preferred stock. Counsel
for plaintiff stated that he had the certificates bearing
the endorsement of the administrator of the estate of
Robert Young, and that there is a decree of distribution
distributing the stock to the witness.
''MR. JENSEN:

* * *Is that

true~

"~IR.

JONES: \Vell, you say there is. I have
never seen it.

"~IR

JENSEN: \Veil, I haven't seen it either,
but Mr. Young was one of the administrators,
and he tells me-was there such a decree,
Mr. Young~

"A.

Yes. :\fr. P. H. Neeley of Coalville can
furnish all that." ( T. 27 4, 275).

That is all there is as to this witness or his father being
a stockholder. Witness stated that he had known Nephi
J. Hansen since 1918, and that from time to time he has
talked with him. He used to meet him on the streets
in Sugarhouse; that he met him in the early part of
August, 1945, after this stock was distributed to him,
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because Nephi Hansen had contacted the witness's sister
to get in touch with him. He went to Mr. Hansen's office on Hightland Drive and they talked about different
things. The conversation was objected to and sustained
as to "'\Villiam L. Hansen, ( T. 27 6) . 'The witness said
Mr. Hansen offered some holdings in Parley's Canyon
in lieu of witness's stock in Granite Holding Company,
and the witness told him he wasn't interested. The
witness asked hin1 if he were ever going to receive anything, and :J[ r. Hansen did not answer the questic:1.
He didn't tell Mr. Young that he had disposed of the
property on 21st South and Highland Drive. Witness
didn't tell l\Ir. Hansen anything about being a stockholder. He had his stock with him, but didn't show it
to l\fr. Hansen, (T. 278). He had a conversation with
Mr. Hansen in 1946 when Mr. Fay Bates was present.
This was in his office on Highland Drive. Again this
was objected to and sustained as toW. L. Hansen. This
was in the summer of 1946, and they didn't get anything
out of Mr. Hansen. They told him they wanted to find
out about the Granite Holding Company, what the
rentals and revenues were, and he made no reply except to say that his salary would eat up everything, and
he didn't mention the fact that"William L. Hansen had
purchased the property. At this point the court asked
plaintiffs' counsel which one of the men hired him,
and the counsel replied : "I refuse to answer." ( T. 279).
The witness said he wanted to be made a party plaintiff;
that he thought all the time he was a party plaintiff, and
William S. Young was thereupon substituted by the
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court for Robert Young as a party plaintiff, ( T. 280).
A little over a year ago Keith Bates told him the property had been sold. The witness never got notice of
stockholders' meeting, never attended a stockholders'
meeting, never got any information of any sort from the
company, althought his father knew Nephi J. Hansen
prior to 1920. They were interested in the Sugarhouse
Bank together. His father died in 1930. Nothing was
ever said in either of the foregoing conversations with
respect to the books or records of the company, and
witness never asked anything about them. He has been
the owner of the certificates since 1937, and they were
in the safety deposit box from 1930 until that date. They
didn't get around to having the father's estate straightened out until 1934, although he knew the stock was in
the hox all the time. He and his father had holdings
in Sugarhouse, and they used to see Mr. Hansen who
was also interested in the Sugarhouse Bank, ( T. 282,
284). Witness only knows in a general way what the
Granite Holding Company owned in Sugarhouse. He
understood they owned the Granite Mart, (one of the
buildings sold by ~Ir. Hansen prior to the present sale).
Witness wasn't much interested. He thought they owned
the Southeast Furniture Company. He only knew in a
general way, (T. 284, 285 ). 'There was never any dividends turned in by his father, and he never saw any
dividends from the Granite Lumber or Granite Holding
Company. Nephi J. Hansen ran the Granite Holding
Company. He didn't know who the directors were except Lon Fisher, and he didn't inquire as it was none
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of his business, (T. 286, 287). The witness evaded
a direct answer as to whether after his father died he
ever attempted to find out anything about the Granite
Holding Company, (T. 287, 288). He never did anything
about the Granite Holding Company, (T. 289). Nephi
Hansen was running it, and he let him run it without
objection as he saw fit. He never knew what his rights
were in the event dividends were not paid, (T. 289).
Ralph Cutler was the next witness. He testified that
he was the owner of 35 shares in the Granite Lumber
Company, and that he has owned the shares since October 2, 1920, September 16, 1921 and December 4, 1923.
The certificates are for common stock. He also has
owned since October 2, 1920, 10 shares of preferred
stock. He received preferred stock dividends for two
or three years. He has forgotten the amount of dividends in percentages, (T. 293, 294). He has never been
informed of any stockholders' meetings, never received
notice of any stockholders' meetings or actions taken
by the board of directors, although he was well acquainted with Nephi Hansen and lives in Salt Lake City,
(T. 294). He has never talked to him about the Holding
Company. His contacts with Nephi Hansen ceased
around 1924 or 1925, (T. 295). When the holding company took over, he often met Mr. Hansen after the insurance company, the mortgagees, had taken over the
property, and he was operating it under their direction.
This was around 1930 and 1935. He has seen him several
times but never talked business with him. Last year was
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perty had been disposed of. He is a plaintiff, and his
name is on the complaint with his consent. After the
holding company took over, he realized that it had gone
broke. l\[r. Hansen told him he was operating under the
direction of those who held the mortgage and was taking care of the buildings and collected the rents and
so forth, (T. 295). The witness had the impression the
property was taken out of l\Ir. Hansen's hands, and he
was just operating it under the direction of others who
controlled the property. He never knew the situation
exactly. l\Ir. Hansen never told him anything. Whenever
he would ask about the affairs, Mr. Hansen would evade
a direct answer, although at one time he said: ''If there
is anything left out of this company, I'm going to see
that 1ny family gets it.'' This statement was n1ade be'""
tween 1930 and 1935 when l\fr. Hansen was in charge of
the buildings, ('T. 298, 299). He never made any effort
to remove Mr. Hansen as president. He didn't know anybody else who held any stock. He felt that his investment was not a good one and he didn't want it advertised around. He never made any effort to change the
method of operation of the Granite Holding Company.
He knew Nephi Hansen was running it and intended to
run it, (T. 299). Witness just let things slide, (T. 300).
From the early 20's until the time this property was
sold in 1945 he made no effort concerning the Granite
Holding Company to go to stockholders' meetings or
change the management or control the property. Vivian
Jensen is the one who contacted him about this action.
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He hadn't paid any attention to his stock holding until
Vivian Jensen came to see him, (T. 203).
Lewis F. Hansen testified for the plaintiff that he
is a brother of William L. Hansen and was one of the
original plaintiffs in this action, but that he was dismissed as a plaintiff by order of the court; that he was
one of the board of directors at the time the resolution
was passed, Exhibit "D", on July 18, 1945. He signed
the minutes but claimed he signed them four months
after the date and under protest, (T. 327). He didn't
know anything about the purchase of the property by
Bill until after the deed was signed. He had conversations with Bill before the purchase of the property but
not about the property, but in the latter part of 1945
he had a number of conversations and had some difficulties with his brother, and he brought this suit against
him. There was a meeting at his father's house. At
that meeting his father and mother were there, his sister
and her husband, Clyde and himself. That was when
Bill was trying to get the approval of the family for
him to take over the property. At this meeting as far
as he knew the sale had not been consummated. It was
the same week that the board of directors' meeting to
discuss it, (T. 329, 330), was held. At this point in the
testimony Mr. Jensen, attorney for plaintiffs, and the
witness became confused about which meeting they
were talking about, and witness stated after examining
Exhibit "D" that he wasn't at this meeting, but that he
signed the minutes as indicated thereon under protest
four or five months later. There was a meeting at Bill's
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house after the resolution of .July 18 wa~ passed when
the two sisters and three brothers n1et to arbitrate a settlenlent between his brother, Lincoln, and the rest of
the family. This was after the deed to 'Sugarhouse had
been given. The witness here changed his mind about
the meeting and said it was at his father's house, (T.
332, 333), and that it was before the deed was given.
The deed wasn't acknowledged on the 16th of July as
it states. The meeting the witness is now talking about
took place before the deed was acknowledged, and the
meeting was on the 14th of July at the folks' house, and
there were present his two sisters, his brother, Clyde,
and his brother-in-law, Southwick, himself, his mother
and his father and Bill, ( T. 334, 335). At this meeting,
which according to the witness was before the deed was
delivered or before the resoultion was made, the witness, although he had already stated that he knew nothing about the transaction until it was consummated,
stated that Bill had made an off~r on this property and
at this meeting, he said: "I think we ought to do something about the stockholders'', and Bill caused more or
less of a scene, and he thought it was none of the witness's business about the stockholders; that his father
had control and could do what he wanted and that was all
that was said about it, (T. 336). (N~te: the witness, however, signed the resolution with no reservation contained
thereon), and continuing the witness stated that he
signed the minutes, which according to hiin would be
later, authorizing the sale of the property, and he signed
them as a member of the board of directors. Several
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months after Bill took over the property, between three
and seven months, in Bill's office in Sugarhouse, Bill told
them that if they didn't leave him alone he was going to
sell the property. It wasn't long after that that he filed
the complaint, (T. 337, 338).
On cross examination the witness stated that he
was very antagonistic to his brother, admitted that he
had sued his brother and the jury found in favor of
his brother, denied that he threatened in Mr. Jones'
office that if Bill didn't kick Lincoln out of the beer
parlor located in the Sugarhouse property, that he
would see that Bill didn't get the property, and denied
that that was the reason he filed the lawsuit, (T. 340,
341). There was a formal meeting of the board of directors in the middle of July. His father and Clyde and
Knowlton and himself were there, and at that meeting
they authorized his father to check the possibility of a
.sale of the Sugarhouse property. No purchaser or purchase price was mentioned, (T. 342). The court refused
to allow counsel to test the credibility of this witness on
his statement that he desired to save the property for
the stockholders, and the tender was made by Mr. Jones,
counsel for the defendant, William L. Hansen, to show
that this witness knew there was nothing in the property for the stockholders, and so stated. Even counsel
for the plaintiffs agreed with the court that such evidence was material, but the court refused to permit it,
(T. 343, 344). The witness admitted that Bill had offered
$10,000.00 for the property, and when he said that he
wanted to save the property for the stockholders, he
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meant all the stockholders including his father, and that
it wa:5 for his father ·s protection because he was a heavy
stockholder, (T. ~1-1-1). The witness had just stated that
Hooper Knowlton was at the meeting where he, the witness, was, and the record already shows that Hooper
Knowlton was made a director at the same meeting when
the resolution, Exhibit "D", was adopted. The board
of directors meeting that he attended was when they
authorized the father to check into the advisability of
selling the property and to see what he could obtain,
That was between the lOth and the 20th of July, and
the date shown on the deed, July 16, is the day before
the meeting in Sugarhouse when this authorization to
the father was made. He was present at the meeting,
(T. 345). He doesn't recall whether he signed his oath
of office as a director the same day he signed the minutes. He doesn't remember whether he signed them
both at the same time, and upon being shown his oath
of office which was signed July 18, he stated he didn't
sign the minutes the same day, (T. 346, 347). The
witness admitted that the condition of the Sugarhouse
property was going down and how it could be saved
from foreclosure by somebody purchasing it had been
discussed for months before the actual sale to the defendant, William L. Hansen, ('T. 347, 348), and that
the physical condition of the property was going down.
Witness stated that he was collecting most of the rent
most of the time and that "all tenants were anxious
to have a longer lease and raise their rent." (T. 348,
352). When asked if that's why they wanted to sell
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the property because the rents were going up and tenants were asking for increases and longer leases, the
witness evaded an answer, (T. 352, 353), although he
had just testified that the n1eetings between himself and
his father and other members of the family were to try
to salvage something out of the property if possible,
(T. 349). Bill was not a director or a stockholder. 1-'lw
witness had testified that he never knew about the sale
of the property until after it was consum1nated, although
he attended meetings prior to the sale at which the matter was discussed, and that Bill had offered $10,000.00
for the property, (T. 344), and the board of directors
had authorized his father to look into the advisability
of selling the property, (T. 345), because something had
to be salvaged from it. He then testified that the tenants were urging that their rents be doubled and their
leases lengthened, but refused to answer the question
as to why when the property was going up and everything was fine and lovely and tenants were asking that
the rents be doubled, the directors wanted his father
to check into the advisability of selling it. Upon being
press·ed for an answer to this question, he then admitted
that he knew or assumed that Bill was figuring on buying the property and had been talking to his father about
it, (T. 353). On further cross examination the witness
admitted that the upstairs is rented in apartments at
$25.00 each, and that these are under 0. P. A., and
the rents couldn't go up and were frozen and couldn't
be increased, and that the tenants couldn't be put out,
(T. 354, 355). Mr. Jensen, counsel for the plaintiffs,
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objected that regardless of the 0. P. A. regulations you
could put them out, but the court said: "You could
down here. I never could get the Supren1e Court to
tell me whether-". The court apparently changed his
mind on finishing this sentence, but it is obvious that
he was about to say that he could never get this court
to tell him what was to be done, so he was granted the
motion to strike out what was said about the 0. P. A.,
(T. 355 ). Although the witness had testified that he
was there most of the time and collected most of the
rents most of the time, on cross examination when
asked if he discussed with the tenants about expanding
on the lower floor and giving room upstairs, the witness
said: ""I had nothing to do with that", (T. 355).
The plaintiffs offered Werner Kiepe as an expert
on real estate values. ~fr. Kiepe testified that he was a
real estate broker engaged in the business of real estate appraising since 1928, and generally gave his qualification including the fact that he was the first man
to qualify in the State of Utah for the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, (T. 218, 220); that he
appraised the property and improvements at the southwest corner of 21st South and Highland Drive in Sugarhouse with special reference to its market value in the
month of July, 1945, and that he was familiar with real
estate values in Sugarhouse, (T. 220); that he made as
much of an inspection of the building as he could get
into and also examined the data contained in the deposition of Mr. W. L. Hansen which are Exhibits 2, 3 and 4,
the financial statements for 1943, 1944 and 1945. He
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made only one inspection, and that was yesterday, (T.
222). The witness was testifying on Monday, June 21,
1948, so the day he made the inspection was Sunday,
June 20, 1948, (T. 256). When all the stores were closed
but one, and he wasn't able to get into any of the stores,
and all he was able to get into in the building was the
boiler room in the basement and upstairs, and in none
of the stores downstairs. He made his appraisement
from what he saw from the outside, (T. 256, 257). His
appraisal was made on the assumption that the figures
in Exhibits 2, 3 and 4 were true, (T. 222). He measured
the exterior of the building and noted the construction.
They are brick buildings with frame interiors, stone
foundations with some concrete. He didn't have a chance
to view the entire foundations. The buildings evidenced
that they were of average construction, and he took
Mr. Hansen's testimony that there was 293,000 cubic
feet, or about 16,50U ~quare feet on the ground floor,
and he doesn't remember the second floor. (T. 222, 223).
From this examination made as above indicated three
years after the sale he arrived at a market value of the
building of July, 1945, at a repla0ement cost of $115,000.00, ( T. 228), the land being valued on the corner
piece 48x85 at $500.00 a front foot, and the remainder
$350.00 a front foot, making a total value of the land
without improvements, of $80,000.00, then the cost of
the buildings new at $117,200.00 with the depreciation
factor of 70 per cent or $82,040.00, or a depreciated value
of the buildings of $35,160.00 or a total value of $115,160.00 for land and buildings. (T. 226, 227). $115,000.00 is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

49

.... :.

-'

·;:

the ultimate figure he \\·ants to giYe, ( T. :2:2~). rl,here has
been nothing ~old in the in1mediate vicinity to his knowle~lge that i~ ron1paratiYP and nothing in tl~at vieinit~· that
woul<l give him a direct bearing, (T. 230). It was agreed
that a part of the description included in the lis pendens
from which the '"itness 1neasured the land was incorred
because it didn ~t belong to the Granite Holding(_ 'ompany,
and ~Ir. ,Y. L. Hansen had to quit-claim it back to the
original owner, (T. 234). On cross examination the
witness stated that the $500.00 a foot value covered all
of the property on 21st South to its full depth and the
balance on 11th East is the $350.00. These figures are
based on his judgment, and his judgment comes from
a valuation of the property in order to have it pay a
return, and secondly on sales of vacant property; that
there have been no sales in Sugarhouse for quite a long
time, but this month there was a sale at lOth East and
21st South at $400.00 a foot, but that that property is not
comparable and that the values would be 20 per cent
higher today than they were in 1945, but the property
that sold for $400.00 a foot would probably be a little
more than 20 per cent, (T. 236,237, 238). The witness admitted that in July, 1945, the market was depressed. We
were still in a war economy. Some merchants were expanding as fast as they could, others were having difficulties in securing materials and merchandise. There
were buyers anxious to make investments. There was
apprehension about the extension of 0. P. A. to commercial property and freezing of rents on business property, (T. 238, 239). He doesn't know of any sales
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in Sugarhouse or in that vicinity for $500.00 a foot even
today. The sale of the property on the notheast corner
of 21st South and Highland Drive (11th East) in 1936
or 1937 was for $75,000.00. He understood that the
Southeast Furniture Company bought their property
from the Granite Holding Company. He hasn't looked
at it from the point of view of an appraisal. He doesn't
know that it was sold for $65,000.00 in 1939. He knows
where the Granite Mart is, and it is on 21st South right
adjoining this particular property. He thinks there is
about 77 feet there. He doesn't know how deep it is and
doesn't know that in 1941 that property sold for $43,000.00. It is a two story building and is about the same
age as the south building on the subject property built
probably before 1920. He only knows the condition of
the property in question here in 1945 in a general way.
He took into consideration the figures of income and
expenses for the thr·ee years, 1943, 1944 and 1945 and
took into consideration that those were the actual figures
without anything for depreciation, and he didn't find
that the property operated at a loss, ( T. 243). A purchaser if he didn't have $115,000.00 would be quite inte·rested in the mortgage, and that would enter into his
idea of values regardless of theoretical figures of $500.00
a foot and $350.00 a foot.

He would want to know

whether the property would pay for itself, and if the
property wasn't paying for itself and wasn't paying
the interest and wasn't paying the mortgage, it would
be worth a good deal less than $115,000.00, ( T. 244).
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The \Yitnes8 on further cross exmnination admitted
that when he had stated that the Granite :Mart with
77 feet at a purchase price of $43,000.00 was $600.00 a
foot. that the $600.00 a foot was not the value of the
land; that it included the building, so that without the
building on it it would be about 0 of the $600.00 a foot
value, (T. 245). The witness further admitted that the
property in question when he inspected it yesterday
showed that there had been improvements made of recent origin, and that it would be improper to include
them in arriving at a reproduction cost as he had done;
that he has no way of knowing "\Yhat has be~n spent
on this property on improvements since 1945 and that
his replacement figures are replacement of the building
as he saw it yesterday, (T. 247). He thought the salary
paid ~[r. X ephi J. Hansen as shown by Exhibits 2, 3
and 4. was fair, (T. ~49), and he also thought that his
judgment as to replacement cost would he changed by
a better knowledge of improvements which had been
made between 1945 and now, and that replacement costs
are higher today than they were in 1945, and that improvements done since 1945 would cost more than they
did in 1945, (T. 250). He tried to depreciate the property by replacement costs in 1945 without knowing what
the new improvements were since that time, (T. 252),
and the witness finally admitted that if the corporation
had operated the property so that for the three preceding years it did not produce revenue sufficient to
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thing that doesn't produce any profit is worthless",
(T. 253).
On behalf of plaintiff Eugene P. Watkins testified
that he was the secretary of the Beneficial Life Insurance
Company, the mortgagee of the property in question;
that on December 1, 1945, the mortgage was $75,000.00;
July 18, 1945, it was $74,500.00; September 8, 1945,
$73,938.30; that the mortgage in 1941 was $82,528.13;
that in the year 1945 up to July only $500.00 had been
paid on the mortgage, ( T. 265, 266) ; that under the
mortgage after January 1, 1943, until October 1, 1951,
there was due under the mortgage $500.00 per month
plus accrued interest, and then all of the unpaid balance
and interest were due, (T. 267, 268). For 1945 up to
July there had been paid on taxes a total of $1961.76
made in several payments, and interest was paid August
1, 1945, (T. 268); that the Beneficial Life in November,
1945, paid taxes in the amount of $2770.38. The mortgage provides that the mortgagor must make a deposit
each month during the life of the mortgage for the payment of taxes. Their custom was to appropriate the
money first for the interest, then for the taxes, (T. 270).
The total amount of taxes paid in 1945 was paid from
deposits made by the mortgagor, ( T. 271). On December 1, 1944, the mortgage was considerably delinquent
and even more delinquent in July of 1945, and the mortgagee had not waived payment of the $500.00 monthly
payment on the principal, (T. 271). The renewal mortgage in 1941 of $82,000.00 was a renewal of a previous
renewal of $127,500.00 which in turn was a renewal of a
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previous mortgage of $200,000.00, and that mortgage was
in turn a renewal of the previous Inortgage of $150,000.00. The original mortgage was made April 22, 1926,
to the Granite Lumber Company for $150,000.00, then
increased in 1~):27 to $200,00.00, and in December, 1939,
renewed for $127,500.00. The principal payments on the
mortgage were n1ade by conveyance of the properties
and the purchase price applied on the mortgage, (T.
271. 273). The balance due on the mortgage on June 1,
1948, was $61,500.00, (T. 273).
At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case defendant,
'Villiam L. Hansen, made a motion for a non-suit upon
the ground that plaintiffs' evidence showed that William
L. Hansen paid a valuable consideration for the property; that the board of directors formally passed a
resolution authorizing the sale; that the sale was made
in compliance with the resolution; that the corporation
took his money and still has it; that there is no evidence
of fraud. William L. Hansen wasn't a director or stockholder, and that he dealt with the company in the same
manner as the public had dealt with it for at least 25
years; that in 1939 the board of directors authorized
the president and secretary to sell all of the properties
as became necessary in their judgment and as the secretary and president had done on numerous occasions;
that none of the plaintiffs and no stockholder at any
time had complained of the manner in which the business of the company was transacted or made any complaints of any kind; that there was no collusive agreement, no unfair advantage taken of the corporation;
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that the evidence shows that the property was not even
meeting expenses, was deteriorating, the company was
delinquent on the mortgage, and that it had lost all of
its other properties merely for the amount of the mortgage, whereas, this sale was the only sale ever made
where any money was actually received by the company
over and above the amount of the mortgage. What became of the money after it was paid to the company
was no concern of this defendant, and he had no right
to exercise any control over its disposition; that this
defendant had no knowledge of any defects, if any there
were, in the resolution or the minutes, and that the Granite Holding Company and the stockholders are bound as
against this defendant, whether the directors were de
facto or de jure. There was nothing unusual in this
transaction except that the company got more out of
it than it had in other sales; that Nephi Hansen according to the plaintiffs had always operated the company
as his own without objection from them. The court denied the motion for non-suit. Motion for non-suit was
also made on behalf of Granite Holding Company and
denied.
DEFENDANTS' WITNESSES

On the question of the value of the premises at
the time of the purchase the defendant, William L. Hansen, offered two witnesses-Richard F. Harding and S.
R. Nielson, ( T. 364, 384).
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~fr.

Harding is executive vice-president of the Salt
Lake Real Estate Board and former manager for ele,Ten
years for the real estate department of First Security
Trust Company; also secretary of the Real Estate
Board's .Appraisal Connnittee, experienced throughout
these years in the appraising and managing of all types
of property, a civil engineer and associated with a:ll
phases of real estate, (T. 364, 365). In 1945, particularly
in June and July, he was personally familiar with the
property under consideration, had been on the property,
knew its physical condition, had considered a statement
that had been submitted to him with reference to the income and expenses, and he had at that time made an examination of this property for the specific purpose of
determining its valuation. He does not recall at whose
request but does know that he wrote a letter to Nephi
Hansen with respect to the valuation, and that he took
into consideration the income, the rents, the age of
the building, the location, the physical condition of the
property; that he had a general knowledge of property
values in that vicinity, together with the real estate
board's official publication fixing front foot value of
land throughout the entire city regardless of whether or
not there is a building on such land, and that valuation
is still in use and was in use in June and July of 1945,
(T. 367, 368). Land values in Sugarhouse have changed
very little since 1936 because the traffic is not properly
channeled through the streets there. There is no parking available, particularly along the south side of 21st
South and along Highland Drive. This is forcibly
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brought out by 0. P. Skaggs moving out of the district.
As a result of his experience and personal examination
at the time, he came to two conclusions-that in view
of the fact that the owner of the property had been unable to show any net return, that the property from a
financial basis was not worth more than the mortgage. In
fact, they were not making principal payments on the
mortgage. He also secured a current cost of reproduction after breaking the property into four parcels, each
with a different age, and depreciated them to the current life from the estimated ages furnished and reached
a conclusion of $90,000.00 as a total value of the property. He qualified this value by the condition that it
was worth that much only if the postwar retail market
was as anticipated by the optimistic economists. Under
the management of the Granite Holding Company the
property was not worth more than the mortgage itself,
(T. 368, 369). The roof was in bad shape, fire walls
showed considerable disintegration, the store fronts
were obsolete, the apartments were in bad condition and
frozen at an uneconomic rental. In fact, the property
would have been better off without the operation of the
apartments. In his judgment it would have ·cost at that
time upwards of $50,000.00 to do anything to put the
property in competition with property across the street.
Exhibit 6 was offered which is Mr. Harding's letter to
Mr. Nephi Hansen, was objected to and objection sustained. Exhibit 6 establishes the date and the circumstances and should have been received in evidence. It
is here before this court for examination and shows that
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Mr. Harding's report to _Mr. Hansen was 1nade ,June 12
and made no allowance for depreciation. This should
have been receiYed in evidence as it shows that there
was a basis both on the part of the defendant, Granite
Holding Con1pany, and the defendant, "'\Villian1 L. Hansen, for the purchase price paid for this property, ( T.
369, 372).
On cross examination Mr. Harding stated that a.t
the time he examined the property his recollection is
that the occupancy was complete. He knew from his
experience in property management for many years
that the state1nent furnished him as to expenses of
operating the property would be approximately correct.
He definitely charged to the expense of operation interest on the indebtedness against the property. If you
don't make the interest payments, you don't have any
property, (T. 372). He recalls that the mortgage was
approximately $72,000.00 to $74,000.00. The Salt Lake
Real Estate Board is made up of real ,estate agents and
people engaged in the real estate business in Salt Lake
City and also has a division of apartment house owners,
and the witness is also executive vice-president of this
division. The fee for managing property is in some instances higher than 5 per cent and in some instances as
low as 3 per cent of the gross income of the property.
He was not interested in what Mr. Hansen thought of
the property. He reached his own conclusion. Mr. Hansen did not ask him to depress his appraisal, and you
can't say generally that there was or was not an increase in real estate values in 1945 or 1942 or 1943 withSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

58
out analyzing the specific property in question. You
can't make a generalization about it, (T. 380, 381).
Mr. Nielson testified that he is the executive vicepresident of the First Security Bank of Utah in charge
of the Real Estate Department and the mortgage loan
appraisals, and that he has been appraising property
for mortgages with that company and its predecessor
since 1921. He has been salesman, salesmanager, assistant in the mortgage department, assistant vice-president,
preceding his present position as executive vice-president. His business is appraising business and residential
property for mortgage purposes and occasionally for
sales purposes. He was familiar with the property
under consideration in Sugarhous,e in June and July of
1945. He had been in several of the buildings· at various
times and had inspected it for the bank and appraised
it. In June and July of 1945 he went all through the
property, familiarized himself with the income and expenses. He was familiar with the values in Sugarhouse.
His own company has a branch there. He is familiar
with values in 'Sugarhouse, (T. 384, 387). After his
examination for the hank, he quickly decided it wasn't
a property upon which the bank would loan money, and
he told Mr. Nephi Hansen that the bank would not entertain a loan. He came to the conclusion that if the
buildings were managed more efficiently and some
money was available to make som,e repairs and improvements that were necessary, the property might be worth
$90,000.00, but it was necessary to make improvements
in many places in order for it to be worth that amount,
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(T. 387). The roof was in bad condition, and you could
see evidences of leakage in the apartments upstairs and
in the stores downstairs. The fire walls and cornices were
deteriorated to a point where it was dangerous. The
store fronts were not n1odern, (T. 388). On cross examination he reiterated that he made his examination
for the purpose of appraising the building to see whether
it was desirable for the bank to make a loan on it, and
the bank as a result declined to make the loan, {T. 390).
He thought the property was worth $90,000.00 only
if some money was spent on it and good management
was secured for it. He was qualified to express an opinion on the value. $90,000.00 was not the fair market
value of the property. It would only be the market
value if those things were done. He measured the buildings, and from a cubicle measurement you can get quite
an inflated idea of value if you want to. You can build
it up or knock it down, and he was influenced in declining
the loan to some extent by the way the property was
managed and operated and all the rest of the factors
that he has stated, (T. 392). Nephi J. Hansen is the one
who asked him to come out and look at the property for
the purpose of getting a loan on it. On redirect, he
again stated that his value of $90,000.00 was not based
upon the management the property then had, but upon
future good management, plus the needed repairs. He
has an opinion as to front footage value on that property, and using Mr. Kiepe's map, instead of $500.00
a foot, he valued the property at $350.00 a foot, probably
nearer $300.00, and the balance of it at $225.00 a foot,
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which would be a total of either $50,000.00 or $55,000.00
for the real estate, depending upon whether you use
$350.00 a foot or $300.00. This was its value for either
loan or sale purpoHes, ( T. 394). He and his company
are pretty fair about values. He understands market
value to be what a willing purchaser is willing to pay
a willing seller, (T. 395).
The defendant, W. L. Hansen, testified that he became interested in the property in May of 1945, because
he had raised some money to buy a hotel in Oregon, and
the deal fell through. He had about $20,000.00 and was
looking for a place to put it. He was asked if he would
consider working out some kind of a program on the
Sugarhouse property which was very much run down.
His mother was the first one who asked him if he
couldn't do something about it, and later he was asked
by his father. His father and mother asked him. He did
not ask them, (T. 397, 398).
He was not in Sugarhouse for a good many years.
From 1936 until 1942 he operated his hotel in Ashton,
Idaho. In 1942 he leased his hotel and was trying to get
a dehydration plant started in Idaho. Then he spent some
time on his wife's folks' farm in Farmington. He was
not in Sugarhouse but a very few times before the
actual deal for this property was made. He had nothing to do with the management of the property and
nothing whatever to do with his father's business at all.
He had not been close to his father. They had had differences on other property, and they were just not very
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close. He had no business connection with him whatsoever, (T. 399, 400). 'Vhen his mother and then his
father asked him to make an investigation of the property, he went down and looked it over to see what could
be done. He understood his father was the principal
stockholder and didn't even 1."1low there was any preferred stock or anything about the operation of the
business, (T. 400). The physical condition of the property was very bad. One building was built about 1900.
There was a lot of lead pipe fLxtures for drainage that
were breaking very often. The apartments upstairs were
not kept up. There was a low 0. P. A. rent fixed on
them. On the ground floor there was one place not
occupied. The rents were all low. There were no basements under about half of it, and some of the bricks on
the base of the corner property which was built about
1900 had begun to decompose next to the stone foundations, which created a very hazardous condition. He
examined the income, and the sheets, Exhibits 2, 3 and
4, in evidence were compiled from that examination. He
consulted with persons who had knowledge of values in
Sugarhouse, to-wit, Governor Mabey, George Cannon,
Vice-President of the Beneficial Life Insurance Company, Junius Romney, who is administrator for Barnard
Stewart's estate. He knew the values that Harding and
Nielson had fixed on the property, and he made all these
investigations and examinations before he made any
offer. He made the company his offer for the property,
and they had it under consideration for approximately
six weeks. He never had any meeting with the board
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of directors or attended any directors' meetings. He
said nothing to any of the directors with reference to
his purchase except to his father, and all he did to him
was to submit the offer to accept or reject as the board
saw fit. The board accepted it, and he paid his money
and got his deed. His father showed him a letter from
the Beneficial Life showing what the sales were for the
various other pieces of property and how they had been
applied on the mortgage. He had this in mind he recalls at the time of the purchase, (T. 400, 404). He lmew
what the sale price of the property to the Southeast
Furniture was, and the Southeast Furniture property
was $65,000.00. Those buildings were comparatively new,
built of fire brick, had good cement and steel reinforcements for foundations, and had much more square footage than the property he bought, and at least twice or
maybe three times more ground than the property he
bought. He made a calculation at that time as to what
it would cost to make needed repairs, and that was
$10,000.00, ( T. 405). Governo·r Mabey is in California.
He had tried to get him here for this hearing. Plaintiff's counsel objected to witness testifying whether Governor Mabey advised him to buy or not. The witness
conferred with Governor Mabey who had been in business in Sugarhouse for many years in real estate loans
and building finance company, ('T. 405, 406). He had
not had an)~ 1neetings with the fan1ily with reference to
purchasing the property until one meeting imn1ediately
prior to the day before the deed was granted, (T. 406).
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He talked to his brother, L. F. Hansen, about the
and the condition it wn~ in in the earl~· spring of
19-!:J and suggested that L. F. Hansen go down and help
their father and see if there wasn't a possible chance of
saving anything out of the property. Later L. F. Hansen
reported there wasn't any value there. It wasn't worth
the mortgage, and L. F. Hansen refused to have anything
to do with it, (T. 407, 408). The witness made no efforts
whatsoever to influence the directors of the company one
way or another. Since he bought the property he has
put in it of his own money a minimum of $14,000.00, ( T.
408).

propert~·

His father has operated the Granite Holding Company as long as he can remember. He never remembers
anyone else having anything to do with it or the sale of
its property. In his deal with the Granite Holding Company the company was represented by Attorney Ed.
Clyde. He didn't talk to merchants in Sugarhouse as
to what they thought the property was ~~easonably
worth, but he talked to people who were familiar with
business conditions there, (T. 410). He does not know
whether any offer had been made through any real
estate companies placing this property up for public
sale. As far as he was concerned his father was the
entire company subject to the approval of the board of
directors.
On behalf of defendant, N·ephi Hansen, Clyde F.
Hansen was recalled and testified that he is the oldest
member of the Hansen family; that he was a stockholder
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in the Granite Lumber Company and the Granite Holding Company; that he has about $4,500.00 in the company and is very interested in it, has been secretary
since 1929 until the first of this year, (until the first
of 1948), (T. 414). During the winter and early spring
of 1944 and 1945 he discussed with his father the situation so far as this property was concerned. It was when
there was snow on the ground. His father called at his
home in his car and took him up to Ft. Douglas, and
they parked there and talked for an hour or more,
(T. 415). Objection was made to relating the conversation and in the course of the discussion the court said to
counsel for plaintiffs:
''I suppose you have got to show some kind
of collusion in here between this corporation, the
alter ego of Mr. Hansen, and William L. Hansen
in the purchase of the matter. * * * I think I
ought to hear it. The objection will be overruled." (T. 416).
The witness continued to relate the conversation.
The property was getting in such bad shape, and they
had to have money to build it up and to build up the
rental or there was no use fighting for it any more. His
father as president of the company had made efforts to
borrow money from the R. F. C. The witness was with
him. His father made a trip to San Francisco in 1944,
and it was impossible for him to get a loan any pla:ce.
At the time of this conversation neither the defendant,
William L. Hansen, nor anybody else to his knowledge
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had made any oYertnre~ or had come into the picture
to giYe new Inoney to the company, (T. 418).
During the last ten or twelve years, and particularly
in 19-l-! and U1-13 relations were strained between W. L.
Hansen and his father. They had had difficulties and
misunderstandings, and there were strained feelings during that time until just before this sale in S'ugarhouse
was made, ( T. 418, 419). The witness testified that Lewis
Hansen (L. F. Hansen) was the one who got his father
and mother together with Bill in the first instance on
this deal. Upon objection the court struck this evidence,
and we submit that the evidence was competent. (Lewis
Hansen was a dir·ector of the defendant corporation and
had already testified on direct examination tiiat he knew
nothing about the deal). Bill was present at none of the
directors' meetings. When the witness's father talked
to him about the company being in difficulty and needing new money, he, the witness, contacted several people
to find out the value of these premises. He also talked
to several people after Bill made his proposition of
purchase. L. F. Hansen nffirer made any objection or
opposition to this deal with Bill, and all the directors
were satisfied with Bill's proposition, (T. 420, 421).
There was no trouble over the deal until Lew, (L. F.
Hansen), had disagreement with Bill. They were in the
real estate business together, and there was some trouble
developed there. Lew left the company and immediately
started this action. Until that time he had not raised
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holders, (T. 421, 422). The witness took the resolution,
Exhibit "D", signed by all directors, into Mr. Jones,
attorney for W. L. Hansen. The witness gave the minutes to Mr. Jones. Witness discussed the Sugarhouse
transaction on several occasions with L. F. Hansen, and
it was the subject of conversation for som·e time prior
to the time the deed was signed, was discussed at a
meeting on July 11, and the deed was not signed until
after the board of directors took formal action. The
minutes show the deed to be executed on the 16th and
the meeting of the board on the 18th of July. This is
a mistake in date. The witness doesn't know how the
mistake came about, but he is sure that the deed was
not made out until the day following the meeting. At
the time he took the minutes to Mr. Jones they were
signed by all of the board of directors. It already appears from prior witnesses that the first check of
$5,000.00 was not delivered to the company until the
minutes were brought to Mr. Jones, (T. 424). The first
check is dated July 27, 1945, and was cashed July 28,
1945, Exhibit "G", and the deed was recorded July 28,
1945, which is the same day that it was delivered to
W. L. Hansen.
No attempt was made to list the property with a
real estate man or offer it to the public. Witness talked
to others about it though, and when his father told him
the property was run down and couldn't be sold and the
company was about to lose it, he believed what his
father said, (T. 425). Witness never talked to any
lawyer about bringing this action. He had nothing to
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do with being put in as a party plaintiff. Lew did that.
\Yitness can't explain the discrepancy in dates between
the deed and the minutes, but it is very evident that all
it is is a mistake in date, ( T. -!26). \Yitness understood
that $5,000.00 of the $10,000.00 purchase money was to
go to his father, (T. -!27). The second payn1ent check
for $3800.00 is endorsed in his father's handwriting.
The Hansen Holding Company is a company that was
organized to operate some real estate up on Genter
Street, (T. 427). Granite Holding Company had a bank
account in Sugarhouse. He doesn't know why the second
pa)lllent check was put in the Hansen Holding Company. His father made all the checks and deposits,
(T. 429). As a director, witness's first interest was
always for the company. The money received from Bill
for the purchase of the property was the first real
money the Granite Holding Company had ~eceived in
fifteen years, except from rents. The sale to Bill was
for the sale of all the remaining assets of the Granite
Holding Company. After the witness heard of the offer
from Bill, he consulted with Sid Mullcock, Newell Dayton of Tracy Loan & Trust Company, Governor Mabey,
and Junius Romney about the value of this property,
and it was after those conversations that the deed was
executed, ( T. 430, 431).
On re-cross examination witness stated that he was
present at a meeting of the stockholders at which Lew
and Keith Bates were present. At that m,eeting he did
not say that he and Lew had started the lawsuit and
that now he realized they were entirely wrong, nor did
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he say that the stockholders had been cheated. What he
actually said was that there was nothing in the property;
that he had as much interest in it as anybody, (T. 432).
The defendants served notice that they desired
further to cross examine Lewis F. Hansen. Counsel
for the plaintiffs objected, and the court sustained the
objection, stating that defendants could reopen by using
Lewis F. Hansen as their witness. Defendants then made
a tender of cross examination to ask Lewis F. Hansen
the names of the tenants who were anxious to have
their r~ent raised at the time this property was sold to
Bill, Lewis F. Hansen having testified ''I was there more
than anybody else, and all the tenants were anxious
to have longer leases and raise their r·ents ", and that
the rents be doubled, (T. 348, 352), (pages 209, 213 of
the reporter's transcript), and we further offered to
show that Lewis F. Hansen couldn't giv.e the name of
one tenant who had made such a request. The court refused to permit this procedure, but did permit reopening for the purpose of questioning G. M. Southwick who testified that he is the husband of Mary Hansen
Southwick and a son-in-law of Nephi J. Hansen; that he
was at a meeting at the home of Nephi Hansen in June
of 1945 when the sale of the property in Sugarhouse to
Bill was discussed; that at that meeting there were present besides himself N.J. Hansen and wife, the daughters,
LaRue Nebeker and Mary Southwick, his wife, Clyde
Hansen, Lewis and Bill. At that meeting which is the
only meeting he attended Lewis Hansen did not say,
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holders before we do anything like this", nor did Bill
blow up and cause a scene. Nothing of the kind occurred. He was not on the board of directors and didn't
have any stock in the company, (T. 443, 446).
Clyde F. Hansen testified that he knew Joseph E.
Jensen, one of the directors who signed the resolution,
Exhibit "D ". and that he is the father of W. V. Jensen,
referred to throughout the testimony as Vivian Jensen,
and the husband of :Mrs. J. E. Jensen, both plaintiffs
in this case, and that those two plaintiffs have no stock
in the Granite Holding Company, (T. 494).
Keith Bates was re-called by the plaintiffs and
was asked if at a meeting of the stockholders shortly
after this lawsuit had been filed at which Clyde and Lew
Hansen were present, Clyde Hansen stated in substance
and effect that he had been instrumental or had started
this lawsuit, and that he now realized that he was
wrong, or anything like that. Although counsel for the
plaintiff called Mr. Bates as his witness, and asked him
this question, he refused to let Mr. Bates answer it
as he desired. The following appears:

"Q.

Did he make that statement1

''A.

Yes. May I make one

qualification~

"Q. Well, did he make the statement I
''A.

asked~

Yes, in· effect.''

There is no way to determine what the witness desired
to testify to, and there is thus no other evidence in the
record to dispute Clyde Hansen's testimony.
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At the conclusion of W. L. Hansen's testinwny, (T.
408, 409), his counsel was prepared and about to proceed with an account of the expenditures Mr. Hansen
had made and the work he had done on this property.
Thereupon counsel for plaintiff remarked that if there
was going to he an accounting, then such testimony
should be part of the accounting. There was some (L:cussion with the court, which is not reported in the record, merely the word "discussion," (T. 409), at which
it was decided in the interest of time to omit this te3timony of work and labor and money spent until it was
determined whether or not an accounting would be
heard. But immediately after the conclusion of the defendant's testimony, the court held that the reasonable
and fair market value at the time of the sale was
$100,000.00; that the $14,000.00 Bill Hansen had prut
into the property should be deducted from Mr. Kiepe's
appraisement of $11'5,000.00, and that the testimony of
Harding and Nielson tpat the value was $90,000.00 depreciated the property "a little". As to the defendant's ,evidence as to the fair value ascertained at the
. time of the sale, the court said:
''One was by the man who puts mortgages
on and who wants to make sure there is security,
and I have forgotten who gave the other figure.''
(T. 436).
The other figure was given by Mr. Harding, the most
competent and qualified witness of all of them and the
man who since has been called by the national organizaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion to occupy an exerntiYe position in the National Real
Estate Organization. In that frame of rnind the court
held that the deed should be set aside.
"I find that there "Tas a colln~ive arrangement behYeen 'Y"illian1 Hansen and his father,
Nephi J. Hansen, with the intent to defraud these
preferred stockholders of any equity that rnight
be there, and I find that there was some $15,000.00 equity involved at the time of the transfer. Therefore, I order that the deed be set aside
and the property restored to the corporation.
·'Xow, the n1atter of accounting, I suppose
we have got to set that down. Willian1 L. Hansen will have some accounting against this corporation." (T. 437, 438).

This quotation from the court is given here because
later in argument we shall discuss the utter lack of basis
for the decision of the court. The last statement of the
court is interesting, that William L. Hansen will have
an accounting against the corporation, in view of what
the court actually did in giving the corporation a judgment of substantially $30,000.00 against William L. Hansen. At this time and in view of the fact that the court
said that there was a $15,000.00 equity between what was
paid and the value of the property, and that during the
period Bill Hansen had the property there was a $30,000.00 net profit, it will be interesting for plaintiffs'
counsel to explain how income taxes would have been
paid on this $30,000.00 from this property as it was
operated by the corporation and at the same time save
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the $15,000.00 equity. There was no such profit, and
there was no such equity. Both the state and the government permitted the complete depreciation of the
corner building during this period.
(B)

The Alleged Accoum.tilng

Some of the testimony given on this feature of the
case is also applicable to the merits of the main case
and was before the court before any findings, conC'lnsions or judgment was entered herein. Four of the
persons who were tenants of the Granite Holding Company and who remained tenants after the property was
sold testified substantially the same. Walter 0. Peterson occupies the property farthest south on 11th East,
(T. 447). Adelbert W. Hart is just north of Mr. Peterson's location, (T. 456). L. J. Batchelor has the next
location north, and he operates a barber shop, (T. 479).
Then north of him is Melvin L. Brain who operates
Bud's Mens' Duds, (T. 471). Each witness stated that
at the time W. L. Hansen took over the property August
1, 1945, he was paying all the rent that the property was
worth; that none of them ever asked Nephi Hansen to
raise their rent. They were unwilling to have their rent
raised; that the property was in bad condition from the
leaking roof. The plumbing would leak through and
destroy merchandise, and that Nephi Hansen never did
anything to fix up the property, (T. 448, 449, 459, 463,
471, 472, 474, 481). Each witness also testified that after
W. L. Hansen took over the property he made extensive
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

73
,

.....

,

hnprove~uents,

gaYe the tenants n1ore space, fixed upr
the property ~o that the leaks were corrected, and for
the new space and repairs and new leases charged them
additional rents. He also agreed in consideration of
the higher rents to put in new fronts and do other remodeling and renovating which he had not yet done,
and that they "·ere unwilling to pay the new rents unless
the additional work was completed, and that since Bill
took over they have had no dealings with anybody except 'Y. L. Hansen. They have had no dealings whatever
since that time with Nephi J. Hansen, (T. 448). It was
agreed that the new leases contain provisions for remodeling the store fronts "to be done as soon as deemed
, advisable'', ''to remodel the front of said property in
a high class 1nanner", (T. 619, 620).
Defendant offered to show (T. 621) that the work
of remodeling and renovating commenced in 1945 and
was to be done over a period of three years, ( T. 624) ;
that the twenty-six apartments upstairs rented for a
total of $490.00 a month when he took over the property; that the rent of the first store to the south was
$150.00, and under his managem·ent the rent was increased to $300.00 on condition that the remodeling was
done, and that since the court had announced that the
property was to be returned to Granite Holding Company, the tenant has insisted on the rent being adjusted
to $225.00 a month, and that these premises include in
addition to what they had at the time Mr. Hansen took
over three of the upstairs apartments; that part of the
Hart l\{usic Company, (Adelbert W. Hart), was occuSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

74
pied by Lincoln Hansen as a beer parlor paying $75.00
a 1nonth; that defendant terminated his occupancy and
Harts' were given additional space with a basement with
promises of remodeling, which has not been done, at a
rental of $375.00 a month which has now been reduced
since the court's announcements to $250.00; that the
barber shop occupies space formerly occupied by Southeast Camera Company and additional space, and the
rent was fixed at $125.00 which has now been reduced
to $100.00; that Brain, (Bud's Mens' Duds), was paying $125.00 when defendant took over. This was raised
to $175.00 and has now been reduced to $125.00. Where
the Ideal Furniture now is was a restaurant which went
bankrupt. The restaurant was paying $300.00. Ideal
Furniture moved and were given seven apartments upstairs with provision for improvements. Their rent was
raised to $575.00, and their rent has now been reduced
to $550.00. The cleaning company occupies the next
space and are paying the same rent. The dress shop of
Mrs. Stucki was paying $125.00. She was given additional space formerly occupied by Seagull Drug Company. The rent was raised to $310.00 and is now $250:00,
and she is doing her own remodeling. Pehrson Hardwar·e Company occupies the space formerly occupied
by the barber shop and another barber shop on 21st
South, Kemp's Child Clothing Company and Dr. Lanmasser, in addition to their own space, all of which
space was paying $560.00. Their rent was raised to
$650.00, then Pehrson was given 2 apartments upstairs
and additional space and his rent was raised to $750.00,
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and he did all his own renwdeling. Hi~ property was in
very bad condition. His basen1ent was full of refuse
which he had to clean out. He had about one-third of
the space he now has, and has a written agreement with
the defendant to remodel the front of the building and
completely renovate it, probably build a new building;
(defendant paid him $500.00 approxin1ately towards the
re1nodeling,) ( T. 488, 489). The Seagull Drug Store occupies three of the apartments at $70.00 a month for
their office which was formerly on the ground floor.
Three of the apartments are still rented to tenants
and one of them is occupied by the janitor; that the improvements contemplated by the leases and which were
not done were submitted to Ashton & Evans, architects, and to Garff Brothers and to the Nielson Construction Company, and that they submitted estimates
for the contemplated repairs to the front and the repair
of the roof, and at that time when they were to commence in 1945 and to be finished in three years the cost
was estimated at $90,000.00 and would now cost $115,000.00.
A statement had been prepared showing all the work
that had been done by the defendant, and the court
stated that instead of reading that why didn't we
offer it in evidence. It was marked Exhibit 9, was offered, objected to, and the objection sustained, (T. 624,
629). This was offered to support the expenditures
which have been described and the work and labor
perfonned by the defendant on this property. The exhibit is too long to quote but shows extensive remodelSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing and renovating, redecorating and repairing and
major improvements done by the defendant personally
and under his personal supervision and direction and
responsibility for which the court refused him any allowance for his own work and labor or superintendence and
only partial allowance for actual expenditures. We
offered to show by S. R. Nielson who had already testified that he is executiv.e Vice-President of First Security
Trust Company, that for the work Mr. Hansen did in
managing this property, increasing the rentals and
working along with the people, the reasonable value of
his services would be $400.00 a month, and that Sid
Mulcock, a constructor of a great many apartments and
buildings, appraiser for Prudential Savings and
Equitable Life, would testify to the same thing, and
the court sustained the objection to this evidence and
refused to allow anything to Mr. Hansen, (T. 629, 630).
The parties had agreed that Mr. Goddard (of Goddard-Abbey Company) and Mr. Wood (of Beesley-Wood
& Company), certified public accountants, examine the
operations of this property so far as they were ascertainable from August 1, 1945, to June 30, 1948, (T. 497,
498), and Exhibit 7 was ultimately worked out as a
resume of the items of expenditure and the character
of them and the status of them as they are at the present time, and receiv<ed in evidence as illustrative of the
testimony, (T. 603).
Most of volume two of the testimony is taken up
with details of the expenditures, and Exhibit 7 shows
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that :\[r. 'Vood and :\lr. Goddard had agreed on items
of expenditures of $69,093.84, but included in those itmns
were other items which it was contended by the plaintiffs
were not allowable, totaling $11,156.81. From some
green pencil figuring on the exhibit apparently $6,450.00
of these questioned sums were not allowed because they
are deducted from the $69,093.84 iten1, leaving total expenditures of $62,643.84. The eliminated items apparently are salary paid by the defendant to Nephi J.
Hansen of $5,950.00, for which he worked about 40
hours each week, (T. 518, 519), and contribution by the
defendant to the Sugarhouse Chamber of Commerce for
the Cenntennial program of $500.00, both of which should
have been allowed, as we shall hereafter point out. As
heretofore noted from Exhibits 2, 3 and 4, Nephi J.
Hansen in 1943, 1944 and 1945 was paid by the company
$5,404.12 in 28 months. Under W. L. Hansen's ownership in 35 months he was paid only $5,950.00. Yet the
court held the sale was for the benefit of Nephi J. Hansen and refused to allow W. L. Hansen any credit. Nephi
got less than when he managed the property, and Bill
was allowed nothing. The defendant testified that the
Sugarhouse Chamber of Commerce assessed all the merchants in Sugarhouse for the Centennial program, and
that the $500.00 was the amount assessed to this property. It would have been assessed no matter who the
owner was and was a legitimate item of expense. Page
2 of Exhibit 7 is a schedule of expenditures actually
made, as agreed upon by the auditors, but contested
by the plaintiffs, though they were actually made on the
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property. Some of them are cash payments for which
receipts were available, and the remainder were represented by checks or verified by the testimony of W. L.
Hansen and are undisputed as actual expenditures.
These items on page 2 bring the total expenditures for
the period as shown by the testimony to the sum of
$79,692.36. On pages 1 and 2 are som·e green pencil
crosses and check n1arks and som.e writing in ink, which
were not on the exhibit when it was received and apparently indicate that $2,584.20 of the amount specified
on page 2 were added to the $62,643.84 shown in green
pencil on page 1, making a total of $65,228.04. This
apparently would exclude $8,014.32 of the items shown
on page 2, and the total of the figures with the cross
after them total this amount, so that excluded are $600.00
paid by the defendant for entertaining contractors, tenants and employees with reference to the new leases and
repairs. The defendant testified that these items were
less than 0 of his bill at the Ambassador Club or at
the rate of $20.00 a month for 30 months, and that he
incurred these expenses for conferences, and to promote
good will and get the new leases and to get the repairs
accomplished, ( T. 531, 536) ; $208.01 telephone bill based
upon the monthly rate of $11.93 plus 0 of the long distance telephone calls; $443.00 which was interest paid
on a loan from the Davis County Bank, all of the loan
being used on the property; $1,117.50 attorney's fees
which were paid for legal services on the leases, income
tax statements, which included securing permission from
both the state and the federal government to depreSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ciate the entire property on the corner, and $5,609.15
which represents checks .drawn to rash, (T. 605, 615),
whieh the defendant testified went into the property
in pay1nent of laborers, materialmen and others who
required cash payments. He kept no record of the exact
items since he figured the property was his own and it
allcrune out of his own pocket, (T. 637).
It is to be conjectured, therefore, since there is no
finding of specific items, that from the actual expenditures made by the defendant, $14,464.32 were stricken
and that no allowance whatever was made for defendant'~ 1nanagement or ~ervices, nor for the $10,000.00
in cash with interest he paid to the defendant corporation. So this defendant was deprived of credit for at
least $26,264.32 he paid out in actual cash.
The figure $90,017.00 appears in ink on Exhibit 7,
and this was the figure that the accountants agreed upon
as the total rent received during the period of August
1, 1945, to June 30, 1948, but does not take into consideration the reductions in rent that were made due to the
court's announcement that he was going to cancel the
deed. The rents were paid upon defendant's agreement
to make extensive improvements which the company
could not make while it operated the property. However,
we did not agree that this figure was proper. The rents
were collected not through the efforts of the plaintiffs
or the defendant corporation, but solely through the
efforts of the defendant, W. L. Hansen, ('T. 498). Our
position was that the defendant was not chargeable to the
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corporation for the $90,000.00. ''All that William L.
Hansen is chargeable to the corporation for is the reasonable rental value of the property in the condition
in which he took it", (T. 503). If this property is to
be returned, both parties must be placed in status quo,
and if the defendant corporation gets the property back
better than it was before, they must pay for the improvements, (T. 507). As shown by Exhibit 2 in 1945
before the defendant took over the property, the corporation was receiving in actual rents $1,983.00 a month
and were paying N. J. Hansen in that year $318.50 a
month salary for doing the same thing he did while
the defendant was in possession of the property; that
for the previous two years the rentals averaged $1,132.50
a month for 1943 and $1,459.00 a month for 1944, and
l\ir. Hansen's salary for the two years was approximat,ely $175.00 per month, so that we could not be
charged more than the corporation itself was receiving
and were entitled to the same payments to Mr. Hansen
as it had been making itself.
After the court announced the property was to be
returned to the corporation, the tenants, as shown by
Exhibit 10 and the testimony of the tenants and Mr.
W. L. Hansen, insisted on their rents being reduced because the improvements which were a major consideration for the increase in their rents were not to he made.
Exhibit 8 shows rentals for July, August and September of 1948 in the total sum of $7,669.00 and expenses actually paid of $4,577.73

wi~h

the proportion of
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accrued expenses applicable to those three Inonths in
the sun1 of $:2,-!1 :2.31, leaYing a net for the three months
of $618.76. The figures in ink on Exhibit 8 which were
not there when it was offered and received apparently
show that $713.43 of the repairs were not allowed, although they were actually made, ( T. 608, 613). Nearly
0 of the telephone bill was not allowed, nor none of
the office expense actually paid, which included the
customary expenditures for office supplies allowable by
good accounting practices, ( T. 609), including a desk and
filing cabinets, and none of the chargeable expenses
for the three months whieh had accrued but not been
paid, totaling $2,412.51, nor none of the office salary
of $200.00 per month. These accrued expenses were required, as appears from Exhibit 8, and have since been
paid, but none of them were allowed apparently, and
while the defendant was charged with all the rent which
was due to his own efforts, he was given credit for
none of these expenditures and there appears on Exhibit
8 a deduction from the rental of $3,211.91, leaving a
figure of $4,457.09 which is added to a figure of $24,788.96, making a total of $29,246.05. Where the figure
$24,788.96 comes from, we do not know, except that on
Exhibit 7 on the 2nd page at the bottom the figure
appears apparently as a deduction over the whittled
down expenses over the ·exaggerated income, so that
apparently $29,246.05 is computed as the net income of
the property for the period August 1, 1945, to September 30, 1948, disallowing all the items indicated, including
?\pphi J. Hansen's salary which was actually paid. No
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allowance for W. L. Hansen's management which was
responsible for producing the amount he was charged
with, and nothing for his $10,000.00 purchase price,
and nothing for interest on it.
Practically all of volume 2 of the reporter's transcript is taken up with a detail of the expenditures as
summarized on Exhibits 7 and 8, and a detailed recital
of the methods by which the rent was increased. Exhibit 8 was received in evidence, (T. 606). No useful purpose could be served in a detail of this evidence since
the summary of it appears on the two exhibits, and all
of the expenditures are supported by the testimony, and
as shown in the offer of proof, Exhibit 9.
During the discussion on the motion for a nonsuit the court in answer to our assertion that there was
not one single word of fraud or proof of fraud in this
case, stated: ''I have the testimony of the last witness, L. F. Hansen, that the father was 80 years old;
that he was under the influence of Bill." (T. 361). This
same witness in the same testimony also stated that he
was the one who wanted to protect the stockholders because all the tenants were asking that the rent be
doubled. The father was not 80 years old at the time
of the transaction in question. He was 76, ( T. 519). He
was not under the influence of Bill but had been
estranged from Bill for years. Bill had not even been
here for years prior to the transaction, and the court
later himself indicated that L. F. Hansen was not worthy
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of belief as did counsel for the plaintiffs who called
him as a witness. The following appears:
''THE COURT: :1\Ir. Jones, are you calling each
tenant here to have' him to say that he wasn't
willing and anxious to have his rent raised~
''MR. JONES : That he never said anything
about it.
"1\;fR. JENSEN: I will stipulate that they will
so testify. I never saw a tenant yet who was
willing to have his rent raised. (T. 453).
•

:1:·

•

:1(:

''THE COURT: Did you say you want to show
that they were not willing to or didn't pay~
'':MR. JONES: That they were not willing to.
They paid all the property was worth all
through the years.
"THE COURT: I understand Mr. Jensen has
stipulated that none of the tenants will say
they were willing to pay more rent.
• "" • "" I just supposed no tenant in his right
mind is anxious and willing to have his rent
raised. I can't conceive of it." ( T. 454).
The following appears: (T. 617).
"MR. JONES: Now, Your Honor, you announced at the time when we concluded that
you were not going to consider the work that
Mr. Hansen did out there, and I can shorten
this by making a tender of proof.
''THE COURT: I understand Mr. Jensen
wasn't going to object to it. He was of the
opinion that his recovery was permissible.
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''MR. JONES:

Oh.

"THE COURT: And, certainly, I'm not going
to stand against both of you.
"MR. JONES:

Okeh.

"MR. JENSEN: Well, wait a Ininute. I didn't
hear what You Honor said. Read that, will
you, ~fiss Parker~
(Reporter reads the Court's statement.)
"THE COURT: You mean you have had a
change of heart~
''MR. JENSEN:
low that~

You mean I was going to al-

"THE COURT:

Yes.

''MR. JENSEN: Oh, yes. They had Sid Nielson down the last time and went to put him
on, and Mr. Jones told you what he was going
to prove by him, the reasonable charge for
supervision and property management duties, and I objected to it on the ground it
wasn't allowable, and Your Honor sustained
it. I have already changed my mind if I
ever needed to.

* *
"THE COURT:

* *

Is it in the

record~

"MR. JONES: No. There was discussion about
it, and Nielson was here, and I said I was
going to show what l\ rr. Hansen had done
there and the work he had done.
''THE COURT: All right Inake your tender
now, .:\fr. Jones." (T. 618).
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The tender was made and refused that experts would
testify that ~[r. \Y. L. Hansen's sPrvices were reasonably
worth $400.00 a month. (T. 629, 630).
In disallowing any salary toN. J. Hansen the court
did it in the face of testimony that :Mr. Hansen worked
at least 40 hours a week. took care of the office, answered
the phone, did about the same work as an office girl or
stenographer, collected the rents when William L. Hansen was out, gave receipts for them and turned them over
to ~Ir. "\Y. L. Hansen, and for his servicet:; he was paid
about $170.00 a nwnth, when the corporation itself had
paid him more than double that amount in the period
just preceding the sale of this property toW. L. Hansen,
( T. 318, 520). The $500.00 disallowed as the assessment
for the Centennial program, is the same as the property
on each corner was assessed by the Sugarhouse Chamber
of Commerce. The assessment was not a personal assessment but was an assessment against the property. All the
merchants were requested to make a like contribution,
and under those circumstances the $500.00 was paid for
this propert)T, (T. ;)24). With reference to the $600.00 disallowed as Ambassador Club charges, the total bill at the
Ambassador Club was $1376.18. During this period when
defendant Bill Hansen was trying to get the rents increased and the program of in1provements inaugurated,
he would take the people to lunch or dinner to discuss the
question, build up the good will, and the $600.00 he
charged does not quite approximate $20.00 a 1nonth for
the period. He figured that this was a proper charge for
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building up good will in business and public relations, especially in view of the results obtained, (T. 531, 532, 534).
Disallowance was made in the telephone bill in the face of
the testimony that it was used exclusively for the benefit
of the business with the exception of a few long distance
calls, ( T. '540). Disallowance was made of the interest
paid to the Davis County Bank in the face of the testimony that it was interest on mony borrowed from the'
Davis County Bank that all went into improvements on
the property, (T. 563, 564). With reference to the attorney's fees disallowed, the testimony was undisputed
that they were for legal services in arranging the leases
and preparing income tax returns and negotiating for
depreciation on the property and securing approval of
the state and the government, which directly benefited
the corporation, ·except $500.00 which was paid for services in connection with the purchase of the property.
( T .569). In explaining the checks to cash representing a
total of $5,609.15, W. L. Hansen testified that practically
all of it went into the property, paying for help and paying for material.
''A. Well, at that time we had labor that was a
little hard to get along with, using to begin
with Union help, and then their work wasn't
very satisfactory, and finally hired some farmers and other people who we found were
willing workers, but they requested they be
paid in cash, so we paid them in cash.

'' Q. How many of those people did you have?
''A. About three different ones.
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"Q. Well, now, how long did they workY
'· ~\.

''Q. Now, were there any supplies represented
in theref
··A.

Yes, there was some supplies. I couldn't
say exactly just what they were because I
was operating my own business, and I didn't
keep track of the things. If we needed money
to buy things where we didn't have accounts,
we just cashed a check and would buy them
and pay cash for them and let them go at
that." (T. 615, 616).

''A.

I didn't pay any attention to the checks. I
made them out and just operated my own
business, and I figured it was all my property, and I made out the checks. I didn'tfrmn one month to the next I didn't even
check to see what they were, really." (T. 637).

i:

1.

\Yell, they worked in-one of them in '45
a lot of work, a lot of hours in '45 and right
on through up until about July of '47 or August of '47, approximately.

~[r.

Hansen also stated that the work of putting
in the new store fronts has yet to be done, as above
indicated, at an expense estimated at $115,000.00 for
which he had obligated himself and received rental payments in consideration thereof for which the court
charged him for the benefit of the defendant corporation.
The court also charged him with rental paid for the
last three months accounted for in 1948 and refus·ed to
allow him anything for the accrued· expenses which he
was obligated to pay, (T. 612, 613).
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After the case was submitted and after the court had
made an entered order of judgment against defendant,
\Villiam L. Hansen, for $29,246.05, (T. 100), the court
without consulting the defendants or any of them, and
upon motion of plaintiffs' counsel dismissed J. R. and
W. V. Jensen as plaintiffs, (T. 101, 102). There was no
J. R. Jensen as a plaintiff, and W. V. Jensen is the
Vivian J·ensen who appears throughout the record as the
active instigator of this litigation in connection with Lewis
F. Hansen. No notice of this dismissal was ever given defendant, so that as the case stands it is dismissed as
against the instigators of the lawsuit with the resulting
responsibility for costs in the event this case is decided
in favor of the defendant.
On December 24, 1948, the day before Christmas,
plaintiffs served on defendants proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law, (T. 103), and immediately thereafter and without opportunity for the defendants to
propose any amendments the court on the same day
signed the findings of fact and conclusions of law and
judgment, (T. 104, 113), and the judgment was immediately ·entered on the same day. There never was any opportunity for the defendants to be heard, nor were they
heard with reference to the findings o~ fact, conclusions
of law. This was a proceeding strictly between counsel
for the plaintiffs and the court.
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III.

Fl~TDIXGS

OF F.ACT, C(XNCLUSIONS OF LAW
AXD JUDGJIEST.

The court affirn1atively found that this action is a
secondary one for the benefit of the corporation brought
by the above named plaintiffs against the corporation,
Finding 2, ( T. 105). (X ote: X one of thP original plaintiffs remain in the case, and only two, Ralph Cutler and
Hettie ~lay Bates, of the six who began the action. Robert Young, an original plaintiff, was dead when the action was brought. \V. Y. Jensen and :Mrs. J. E. Jensen
were not stockholders, but were son and widow respectively of J. E. Jensen, one of the directors who signed
the resolution for the transfer of the property, as did
Lewis F. Hansen, another director, plaintiff). The findings further find that Nephi J. Hansen since 1928 has
been a director and president and general manager and
wholly in control of the corporation; that no meetings
of the stockholders have been held, vacancies in the
board of directors were not filled, no information was
given to stockholders with respect to the financial situation of the corporation. Nephi Hansen had represented
that there was nothing to do except liquidate the mortgage, and that he has had full charge of all activities of
the corporation, kept no books or records, during all the
period discouraged the stockholders and refused to give
them any information, made all decisions with respect
to the corporation, repeatedly told the stockholders that
he was liquidating the mortgage and indebtedness, and
at all of the times treated and acted towards the corSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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poration as if it was his own. He made no accounting
to any stockholders and generally conducted the affairs of the corporation as his own personal property,
"and as his alter ego", (T. 105); that the articles were
amended in 1919 to provide for the issuance of preferred
stock, with voting power if dividends were not paid;
that Nephi Hansen had informed the preferred stockholders that no dividends could be paid and had refused
to give any information to the stockholders with reference to the nature and condition of the business except
to assure them that everything was in good hands and
properly taken care of; that the corporation in 1945
owned the property in question which had buildings
on it facing 11th East and 21st South, occupied by tenants in apartments upstairs and business houses on the
ground floor; that from August 1, 1945, to September
30, 1948, it had a total income of $97,686.00, an average
of approximately $2,500.00 a month; that on July 18,
1945, there was a mortgage of $74,500.00 on the property, payable at the rate of $500.00 a month, plus interest; that on said date the interest payments were up
to date but the principal payments were in arrears;
that the mortgage was placed on the property November 1, 1941, in the sum of $82,528.13, and that in July,
1945, the property was reasonably worth $100,000.00.
That in July, 1945, vacancies in the board of directors were caused to be filled by Nephi J. Hansen, "and
there was appointed directors so that the board of Directors of said corporation at said time consisted of
said Nephi J. Hansen, Laura F. Hansen, his wife, ·Mary
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t-

H. South'\\ick, his daughter, L. F. Hansen, his son,
Clyde Hansen, his son, Hooper J. Knowlton, a business
friend of Nephi J. Hansen, and one Joseph E. Jensen,
there being added to said Board of Directors at said
time Mary H. Southwick, L. F. Hansen and Hooper J.
Knowlton." (T. 107). (Note: L. F. Hansen was always a member of the board of directors, as already
appears heretofore). That in July, 1945, Nephi J. Hansen in the name of the corporation caused the property
to be deeded to his son and caused the board of directors
to adopt a resolution authorizing and confirming the
sale to William L. Hansen for $10,000.00; that the corporation never received the money, but the same was
paid by William L. Hansen to his father and by his
father used for his own purposes, and tlie sale by Nephi
J. Hansen was never approved or ratified by the stockholders. ''That in making said sale said Nephi J. Hansen did not attempt to obtain any offers from any other
person whomsoever, nor did he list the same with any
real estate agent or broker, and thereafter caused a
deed in which said corporation appeared as grantor to
be delivered to the defendant William L. Hansen, which
deed was thereafter recorded in the office of the County
Recorder of Salt Lake County.'' That the property was
all the remaining assets of the defendant; "that no
stockholder was ever advised by said Nephi J. Hansen
with respect to said sale; that said Nephi J. Hansen
had always regarded said property as his own personal

property, and that in so selling to his son William L.
Hansen he maintained that said property should be
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taken away from said corporation and should pass to a
member of his family and that said property should become in fact the property of the family Nephi J. Hansen by and through said William L. Hansen, and said
William L. Hansen, in taking title to said property, did
so in order to keep complete control thereof to gain
for himself the rents, issues and profits thereof and to
insure income to his father, Nephi J. Hansen, and to
defraud said corporation and the stockholders of said
corporation.'' That William L. Hansen knew the money
he paid would not be used by the corporation but would
be used by Nephi J. Hansen for his own use, (T. 108).
That the board of directors at the time of the sale
and the resolution approving the sale was illegally constituted and acted improperly for the reason that the
directors were either members of Nephi Hansen's family, or his friends, and as such were subject to the
control of Nephi Hansen, and signed the resolution without any independent knowledge of the facts and solely
upon reliance on statements and information of Nephi
J. Hansen and without an independent judgment and
without knowledge of the terms of said sale and at a
time when the deed to the property had been executed
and delivered. (Note: The record is undisputed that
the deed was not delivered until July 28, 1945. The
record is also undisputed that regardless of the date
on the deed it was not executed until the day after the
meeting of the board of directors). The findings of
fact also find that Nephi J. Hansen prepared a resolution dated July 18, 1945, which was in fact prepared and
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signed after that date and thus prepared and signed in
order to falsify corporate records. The sale was made
without any authority or bona fide ratification of the
board of directors or of stockholders; that the resolution
was signed by the board of directors of the corporation
individually, and not as a part of any regular or special
meeting of the board, ( T. 109).
The findings then assert that on August 1, 1945,
defendant, William L. Hansen, went into possession and
collected rents to and including September 30 in the sum
of $97,686.00, and that during that period he expended
money for the preservation, operation and maintenance
of the property and is entitled to a credit against said
rents in the sum of $68,439.95. (Note: This is the only
finding with reference to expenditures. There is no
itemization or other finding with reference thereto).
The court further found that the plaintiffs are not
estopped; that the sale of the property was not an act
of the corporation; that the directors acted outside of
their authority; that the sale was not made in the usual
course of business; that the possession of William L.
Hansen was wrongful ''and he took possession thereof
as a trustee for said corporation and for the plaintiffs,
and he then and there become a trustee of all moneys
and rents," etc., and was charged with accounting to
the corporation.
The court thereupon concludes that the deed is void;
that William L. Hansen was a trustee for the benefit of
the Granite Holding Company, and indebted to the corSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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poration in the sum of $29,246.05, and judgment was
entered adjuding that the deed" is void and of no force
and effect, and that Granite Holding Company, a corporation is the owner in fee of the following described
property situate in Salt Lake County, State of Utah."
( T. 112). The property is then described and judgment
is entered in favor of the Granite Holding Company
against William L. Hansen in the sum of $29,246.05
with costs to the above named plaintiffs. No judgment
whatever was entered with reference to Nephi J. Hansen, and judgment was entered in favor of the Granite
Holding Company, ( T. 113), in the face of the finding
that the case had been vigorously opposed by the corporation, ( T. 110).
As heretofore shown, the judgment was entered on
the day before Christmas without notice to the defendants, and imn1ediately after the Christmas holidays plaintiffs made a motion for the appointment of a receiver, (T.
116), and on February 3 the court made an order appointing a receiver, (T. 123), which order was revoked February 15, 1949, because the defendants had already posted
stay bond on January 20, 1949, (T. 127), which stay bond
defendants were compelled to post in the sum of
$30,000.00.
STATEMENT OF ERRORS
The court erred in holding that this action
was brought by the above named plaintiffs, Ralph Cutler,
Hettie May Bates, and William S. Young, against the
1.
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Granite Holding Company for the benefit of the Granite
Holding Company, (T. 103).
2. The court erred in holding that since 1928 no
information was given to stockholders with respect
to the financial situation of the corporation, and that
Xephi J. Hansen at all times refused to give information
to any stockholders with respect thereto, except to assure
then1 that everything was in good hands and being properly taken care of, (T. 105, 106).

3. That the court erred in failing to find what the
income and expenses of the property were during the
period the san1e was in the control and management of
the defendant corporation, and in finding that from
August 1, 1945, to and including September 30, 1948,
the property had a total income of $97,686.00, ( T. 107).
4. That the court erred in failing to find that at
the time of the sale of the property it was in a badly
run down and deteriorated condition, was not paying its
way, was operating at a loss; that no additional financing
for the property could be secured; that independent appraisals by competent persons were made of the property at the time of the sale appraising the property at
less than the sale price and at approximately the sale
price, and that the court erred in finding that in July
of 1945 the property was reasonably worth $100,000.00,
(T. 107).
5.

That finding of fact No. 6 is ambiguous and con-

tradictory in that it finds that the board of directors
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was filled and was complete at the time of the sale in
question, and that there were appointed to the board
of directors the persons named, and then finds that
Nephi Hansen caused all the acts to be done therein recited, in the face of the finding that the board of directors was completed and acting, and that the court
erred in finding that the corporation never received the
money paid by William L. Hansen, and that finding of
fact No. 6 is a conclusion of law unsupported by any
findings of fact or by any evidence.
6. The court erred in making finding of fact No.7,
and particularly that Nephi Hansen sold the property
to William L. Hansen so that' it should be taken away
from the corporation and passed to a member of his
family, and that the property in fact became the property of the family of Nephi Hansen, and then finding
that William Hansen took the property in order to keep
complete control thereof for himself and to insure an
income to his father, and said finding is further in error
in finding that William L. Hansen knew that the purchase money would not be used for corporate purposes,
(T. 108).
7. The court erred in finding of fact No. 8, and the
same is entirely unsupported by any evidence and is
contrary to the evidence and forms no basis of any finding against defendant, William L. Hansen.
8. The court erred in finding No. 9 that William
L. Hansen is accountable for $97,686.00 and entitled only
to a credit of $68,439.95.
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9. That finding No. 10 is a conclusion of law based
upon no eYidenre and is against the evidencP that plaintiffs are not estopped.
10. That finding N" o. 11 that the defendant corporation vigorously defended this action and thus opposed
it is contrary to finding No. 2 that the action is for the
benefit of the corporation, and is contrary to the judgment in favor of the corporation.
11. That finding No. 12 is a conclusion of law not
supported by any evidence and is contrary to and against
the evidence.
12. That finding No. 13 that William L. Hansen
was a trustee and took possession wrongfully is a conclusion of law and is against the evidence, not .supported
by any evidence, and is contrary to law.
13. That the conclusions of law and each of them
are erroneous and against the evidence in concluding
that the deed to William L. Hansen is void, and that
William L. Hansen is indebted to the corporation, and
that the corporation is entitled to judgment against
William L. Hansen.
14. That the judgment is contrary to the evidence,
is not supported by the evidence, is contrary to the findings, and is against the law in adjudging that the deed
to William L. Hansen is void and that Granite Holding
Company is the owner of the property in question and
that Granite Holding Company recover judgment
against \Yilliain L. Hansen in the sum of $29,246.05.
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15. That the court erred in finding in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendant, William L. Hansen.
16. That the court erred in giving judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs and in favor of the Granite Holding Company and against the defendant, William L.
Hansen.
17. That the court erred in dismissing without notice one of the instigators of this litigation, W. V. J ensen, and in attempting to dismiss his mother, Mrs. J. E.
Jensen, (T. 101, 102).
18. That the court erred in signing the findings of
fact, conclusions of law and judgment on the same day
they were served on defendants and without an opportunity on the part of the defendants to object to the
same.
19. That the court erred in failing to find that all
of the acts and conduct of the defendant corporation and
Nephi J. Hansen were acquiesced in throughout the
years by all of the plaintiffs, and that som·e of the
plaintiffs were active participants in the consummation
of the transaction sought to be repudiated, and in failing to find that plaintiffs sought to repudiate the affirmative action on the part of some of them and the
acts of· the corporation so far as all of them are concerned made in the usual and ordinary manner that all
acts of the corporation had been performed for more
than twenty years without objection on the part of any
of the plaintiffs.
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ARGUTh[ENT
This being an equity action, it becomes relevant to
scrutinize the identity of the plaintiffs and their own
acts and conduct and to ascertain whether or not they
are free ~rom blame and if in seeking equity they are
ready and able to do equity. It also becomes material
for and this court may review the evidence to determine
whether or not equity has been done. Therefore, it probably will aid this court if we discuss the problem under
three headings: I. The Plaintiffs, Their Pleadings, and
Conduct; II. The Deed Should have been Declared Valid;
III. The Accounting is Wrong. Necessarily the question
of estoppel arises both against the plaintiffs as individuals and as stockholders under heading I, and against
the plaintiffs as stockholders and the corporation itself
under heading II, and under heading III must necessarily be discussed the erroneous principles used by
the court throughout the case as well as in the so called
accounting.
MAXIMS OF EQUITY
It may be advantageous briefly to mention some of
the controlling maxims of equity. The trial court seemed
to be unaware of their existence. They require that the
conduct of one who seeks relief shall have been of such
a character as to entitle him to ask the court's assistance.
If not, relief will be denied. ''Nothing can call this court
into activity but conscience, good faith, and reasonable
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diligence." 19 Am. Jur. 319, Sec. 462. (Note: All references under this head are from 19 Am. J ur. by page).
1. One of the most frequently invoked maxims of
equity declares that he who seeks equity must do equity.
At the least, an offer must be made to make restitution
by one seeking rescission or the bill will be dismissed.
A complainant seeking to have a transaction cancelled or
a deed set aside must return or offer to return whatever
he has received, pgs. 319, 320, 321.
2. He who comes into equity must come with clean
hands. Where it appears that the right upon which the
complainant relies has grown out of a wrong or a breach
of duty, relief will be denied. In other words, a complainant will not be permitted to take advantage of his
own wrong, pgs. 323, 324, 325.
3. Where the wrong of one party equals that of
another, the defendant is in the stronger position. Relief
will be denied where the parties have acted with the
same degree of knowledge as to the transaction. Relief
may also be barred by the fact that the complainant has
been influenced by bad motiv·es, pgs. 330, 331, 332.
4.

Equity aids the vigilant, p. 333.

5. Wher,e it appears that one party was in the better position to avert the loss, injury or prejudice which
now must be borne by the one or the other, equity favors
the one who has the inferior opportunity, p. 334.
6. Where equities are equal, the law will prevail,
p. 337.
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7. Laches. The bill will be dismissed where it appears that the complainant stood by and permitted the
defendant to expend sums of money in improving the
prop€rty, p. 356.
The foregoing maxin1s are generally so well known
and understood that discussion of them seems superfluous. Every one of them was violated by the trial court
in this case.
\Ye come now to a consideration of the three headings of this argument.
I. THE PLAINTIFFS, THEIR PLEADINGS
AND CONDUCT
This is a suit by a corporation to set aside a deed
given to a third person who is neither a stockholder nor
a director. The suit is brought allegedly by stockholders
for the benefit of the corporation. The authorities are
uniform and without dissent that actions of this kind
although brought by the stockholders are in fact actions
by the corporation. It is also true that because the action is equitable the plaintiffs even though they sue as
stockholders must themselves be in a position to invoke
the aid of equity, Smit'h vs. Stone, 128 Pac. 612, 621,
(To be discussed in more detail later), citing Noyes on
~~-

f:

Intercorporate Relations and Cook on Corporations (6th
Ed.) See also, Fletcher Cyclopedia on Corporations,

·ir;.

Volume 6, page 6934. (All citations in Fletcher are to
the 1919 edition, including both the 1921 and 1930
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supplements, bot~ of which reaffirm the principles annonuced in the main edition.)
The action was originally commenced by Lewis F.
Hansen and Clyde Hansen ( T. 1), to set aside a deed
to the defendant, William L. Hansen, dated July 16,
1945, and delivered to him July 28, 1945. Both plaintiffs
were directors who voted (Exhibit '' D' '), to sell the property, and authorized the president and secretary to
execute and deliver the deed, (Exhibit "E"). The resolution authorizing the deed was adopted after several
meetings of the directors, including meetings on the 11th
and 16th of July, (T. 202, 203), and was delivered by
the secretary of the company, signed by all of the directors, to the attorney for the defendant, W. L. Hansen, (T. 422). Clyde Hansen never did authorize the use
of his name as a plaintiff, (T. 426). He was dismissed
as a plaintiff at the hearing on the first demurrers to
the complaint, April21, 1947, (T. 22). The deed in question was delivered and the money paid, (T. 313, 314),
July 28, 1945, but the complaint was not filed until December 21, 1946, seventeen months thereafter and the
summons was not served until the 23rd of December, 1946. The plaintiff, Lewis F. Hansen, waited
nearly one and one-half years to bring this action,
and then based the action upon what he alleged was his
own fraud as a director, so that he could benefit therefrom as a stockholder. He knew that the defendant, W.
L. Hansen, had made many changes and improvements
and had spent substantial sums of his own money on the
property. Neither the corporation nor the plaintiff diSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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rector came into equity with clean hands; both of them
were guilty of laches; both of them were in the superior
position to know whether their conduct was right or
wrong; both of them were seeking to take advantage of
their own wrong, and neither of them offered to do
equity. Neither Lewis F. Hansen nor his attorney chose
to submit the1nselves to the trial of this matter as a
party and attorney, and on May 18, 1948, a month before
the case came on for trial, Lewis F. Hansen withdrew
as a plaintiff, and Benjamin Spence withdrew as his
attorney, and both were dismissed from the case, (T.
74, 75, 76).
The first complaint was signed by Benjamin Spence
as attorney for the plaintiff. Mter the demurrers to
the complaint were sustained, and on .A.ugust 14, 1947,
more than two years after the execution and delivery
of the deed, an amended complaint was filed by Benjamin Spence and LeGrand Backman as attorneys for
the plaintiffs with five additional plaintiffs. LeGrand
Backman never did sign the complaint and never was
an attorney for the plaintiffs and never did make any
appearance for them, (T. 148). The new plaintiffs, W.
Y. Jensen and Mrs. J. E. Jensen, were never stockholders. They are respectively the son and widow of
Joseph E. Jensen, one of fhe directors, who authorized
the deed in question, ( T. 494, 495). W. V. Jensen is
referred to throughout the case as Vivian Jensen. He
and Lewis F. Hansen stirred up all this litigation. W. V.
Jensen contacted the plaintiff, Hettie ~fay Bates, her son
Keith Bates, and plaintiff Ralph Cutler, and Keith Bates
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In turn stirred up plaintiff William S. Young, as appears from the evidence of these witnesses. In other
words, the litigation was instigated and stirred up by
Lewis F. Hansen, Vivian Jensen and Keith Bates.
Neither Vivian Jensen nor Keith Bates were ever stockholders, and Lewis F. Hansen, as we have shown, had
no standing in equity by reason of his own conduct.
At the tirne Lewis Hansen and Benjamin Spence
withdrew, E. C. Jensen entered his appearance as counsel for the plaintiffs, but when the trial court asked him
who hired him, he stated that he refused to answer,
(T. 279).
After the case had been tried and sub1nitted and
the court had announced its decision (with no foundation in the record to support such a decision), J. R.
Jensen and W. V. Jensen, upon n1otion of plaintiffs'
attorneys, were dismissed without notice to defendants, as plaintiffs in this action. There is no J. R. Jensen in the case, and the motion is headed Mrs. J. R. Jensen. She is in fact Mrs. J. E. Jensen, although she appears as Mrs. J. R. Jensen, (T. 102). Thus, as the case
stands, the persons who stirred up this litigation and
who are responsible to the defendant, W. L. Hansen, for
any costs and damages he may sustain have been eliminated from the case. One of the main instigators in this
case was dismissed without the consent of the defendants. The court had no right to release this plaintiff
from his responsibility herein, and it was error to do
so.
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~1 ....

Robert Yotmg appear~ n~ a plaintiff, but he had been
dead for year~ when thi~ action wa~ filed. His son,
"\Villiam S. Young, wa~ substituted as a plaintiff stockholder at the trial of the case. He didn't get into the
case until three years after the deed had been given,
and his standing as a stockholder is extremely questionable, as also is :Jirs. Bates' standing as a holder of her
husband's stock, he having died years ago, (T. 150,
155, 156). :Jirs. Bates is the owner in her own right of
fifty shares of preferred stock. Cutler is the owner of
ten shares of preferred stock and thirty-five shares of
common.
There were subscribed in the company in 1929, as
shown by the certificate attached to the amendment of
the articles, 3500 shares of common stock and 740 shares
of preferred stock. Cutler, therefore, owns 1% of the
common stock, and he and Mrs. Bates together own
60 out of 740 shares of the preferred stock.
Thus, none of the instigators of the litigation remain
in the case, and of the three remaining plaintiffs Robert
Young is dead and is questionably represented by his
son. Robert Young was, and Hettie May Bates and
Ralph Cutler have been stockholders since 1920 or thereabouts, and for at least 25 years knew of the manner
in which the defendant corporation's business was conducted. It was conducted without protest or objection
on the part of any of them. Hettie May Bates some 16
or 17 years ago when her husband died tried to find
out through her brother-in-law, D. E. Judd, cashier of
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the Utah Savings and Trust Company, (T. 160), something about the company, but he couldn't find out very
much about it, and she was told that it had gone bankrupt, ( T. 167). :She knew the company had some property in Sugarhouse, but never knew what it was. She
never received any dividends after two or three years,
and she never protested or objected to any thing the
company did or did not do. She thought Nephi J. Hansen owned the company, (T. 162), but she did not know
what business the company was engaged in, (T. 159).
She never talked to Mr. Hansen about the business of
the company or anything about it, (T. 162, 163). She
has resided in Salt Lake City since 1921, (T. 156), and
all the years she has owned the stock she has never
known anything about the company, (T. 159). Ralph
Cutler has owned his stock since 1920; has never received notice of or attended a stockholders' meeting;
never knew anything about action of the board of directors; has lived in Salt Lake City all the time; was
acquainted with Nephi J. Hansen; never has talked
to him about the Holding Company, nor about the company since it was changed from the Granite Lumber
Company, and that was around 1924 or 1925 (T. 294,
295). After the Holding Company took over, the insurance company that had the mortgage on the property
had taken over the property, and Hansen was operating
it under their direction. This was after 1930, (T. 296).
He realized that the company had gone broke, (T. 297),,
but he didn't know whether Hansen was operating for
the bank or what not. Mr. Hansen never told him anySponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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thing about the affairs of the c01npany except on one
time he said, ••If there is anything left out of this company, I am going to see that my family gets it." This
statement was made between 1930 and 1935, ( T. 298,
299). He never n1ade any effort to remove Nephi as
president. He felt that his investment was a bad one,
and he made no effort to change the n1ethod of operation of the Granite Holding Company, and he knew that
~ephi J. Hansen was running it and intended to run
it, ( T. 299). He never got dividends after the first few
years and supposed they were in a condition where they
couldn't pay, and he just let things slide, (T. 300). He
never read the Articles of Incorporation; has never made
any efforts to go to stockholders' meetings, or to change
the management or control of the company. He never
took any interest until Vivian Jensen came down to see
him, and until that time had never paid any attention
to his stock. It was just locked in his box, (T. 302).
William S. Young is the son of Robert Young, whose
stock dates from 1920, ( T. 27 4, 275). At one time he asked
Mr. Hansen what the revenues and rentals were, and
he made no reply except that his salary would eat up
everything, ( T. 279). His father has been dead since
1930, and he has been the administrator ever since. The
estate wasn't straightened out until after 1934, (T. 283).
He only knew in a general way what the company owned.
He knew they owned the Granite Mart property. He
wasn't much interested in the company until after the
estate was straightened out some time after 1934, (T.
284). He lmew that they owned the Southeast FurniSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ture Company property at one time, ( T. 285). He doesn't
know of any dividends received from the company, (T.
286). Nephi J. Hansen ran the company, but he didn't
know who the directors were except Lon Fisher; never
inquired because it wasn't any of his business. Up to
August, 1945, he made no effort to find out anything
except to meet Mr. Hansen on the street, (T. 287). He
knew nothing about the company and never did anything about it. Nephi Hansen was running it, and he
let him run it without objection as he saw fit, (T. 289).
These matters all appear also from the complaints,
as does the fact that the corporation didn't keep records,
and that all of them knew all the time for upwards of
25 years that there were no meetings of stockholders
or directors and no dividends; that Nephi Hansen was
running the company as he saw fit; that it was being
liquidated; that it had gone broke, and was in the hands
of the mortgagee. They made no effort to change the
form of management or the method of doing business
and sat back during all the years until they were stirred
up by outsiders who had no stock holdings. They were
not vigilant and they made no offer to do equity. Yet
they seek equity in their behalf. They had absolute right
to obtain full knowledge, and they were in a better position than the defendant, W. L. Hansen, to obtain knowledge of the affairs and condition of the company, and
they did nothing. Every maxim of equity would deny
them relief in this case, as would also their own pleadings. It is also true that their holdings and any share they
mig·ht receive in any recovery herein are insignificant
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compared to the nwney the defendant, William L. Hansen, has invested in the property. The demurrers to
the complaint should have been sustained, and certainly the motion for non-suit should have been granted.
It is interesting to note that the same trial judge
who presided in this case held in another case now before this court, (Behm Estate), that a father, who, as
administrator, brought an action against one responsible
for his daughter's death, was guilty of champerty, and·
yet, in the case at bar, allowed persons to stir up litigation who had no interest in it and then permitted them
to withdraw from the case and a judgment to be secured through their intermeddling and in favor of stockholders who had slept upon their alleged rights for a
quarter of a century.
We will be interested to read any cases that counsel
on the other side can cite that will support the trial court
in this action. We have found none, and while we are
not infallible, we are satisfied there are none.

II.

tr/~
~~;~ ·

(A)

THE DEED SHOULD HAVE BEEN
DECLARED VALID

Undf:IY' (Jffl;y view of the Facts the Deed was the
Fa.lid Act of the Corporation.

We shall not attempt to cite many of the numerous
cases or authorities, and they are legion, to show that
the trial court was completely in error from the beginning to the end of this case.
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As we have already pointed out, early in the case,
in fact on the first day, the trial court indicated that we
were going to have to appeal his decision, and that he
had already concluded that there were irregularities and
a quick sale of the property, ( T. 215). He had heard
practically none of the evidence at that time. This, in
spite of the fact that shortly before that time early in
the testimony of the first witness, he said to counsel
for the plaintiffs that we should go into the question of
whether or not plaintiffs should make a tender because
he thought there was merit in that contention. The trial
court said to plaintiffs' counsel:
''Are you in position to make a tender if it
appears that you would have to do so in
order to do equity~
''MR. JENSEN: Well, I am not in a position to
answer that question right now.
''THE COURT: If you are not in position to
to do it, there wouldn't be any need of taking a lot of other evidence and finally come
around to the situation where you would
have to make your tender in order to get
this thing set aside." ( T. 151).
Then, in spite of that statement of the correct rule, the
court refused to require the plaintiffs either to make
a tender or to show their ability to do so, (T. 152). At
the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case, in overruling the
motion for non-suit, the court said as a ground for overruling the motion for non-suit, that Nephi Hansen was
~1.nder the influence of William L. Hansen because ''I
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have the testin1ony of the last witness that the father
was 80 years old: that he was under the influence of
Bill, and that Bill was with him all the time", (T. 361).
The last witness referred to was Lewis F. Hansen, the
self confessed prevaricator and dilrtluent director, who
had testified that he, himself, was present all the time
with his father and was collecting the rents, etc. '• I was
there more than anybody else", (T. 348, 353). Later
in the case the court said that this witness was not
worthy of belief when he stated that the tenants were
trying to get their rents doubled.
At this point, it may be well to add another word
with reference to Lewis F. Hansen. He claimed to have
signed the resolution, Exhibit "D", three or four months
after the date of the meeting and not to have been
present at the meeting. Yet, when confronted with his
oath of office and shown that the date on that was July
18, 1945, he said he couldn't say whether or not he didn't
sign both the minutes and the oath of office at the same
time. "I wouldn't say. I don't remember." (T. 346).
As a matter of fact, he signed them both at the same
time, but it makes no difference when he signed them or
whether he signed the minutes one day or one year
later. Minutes are seldom written up and signed at
the same meeting to which they refer. The fact of the
matter is that there was a meeting, and he was present
at it and his signature no matter when executed attests
the fact that there was such a meeting ; that he was
present and assented to the action taken. If he signed
them four months later, he is even more at fault if they
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were wrong, than had he signed them immediately following the meeting. No one disputed that there was a
meeting of the board of directors. In fact, the evidence
is clear that there were several including the meeting
authorizing this transaction. It is imrnaterial when
the resolution was signed. The important thing is when
was it adopted~ As we shall later show, even had there
been no meetjng and had the directors signed the resolution individually in the absence of a meeting, these plaintiffs could not complain.
At the conclusion of the entire case the trial court
had abandoned the undue influence theory as, of course,
that could not be sustained under any of the facts in
this case, and adopted another and entirely different but
still untenable theory directly in contradiction to the undue influence idea. At that time the court would have
Bill under the influence of his father to save this property for the father. The court said that no one ever
looked upon this corporation as other than the property
of Nephi J. Hansen ; that the court would fix the value
of the building at $100,000.00, on the basis of the expert who had never examined the inside of the building
and had made his examination on a Hunday when it was
closed and three years after the sale. He ignored the
experts who examined the property at the tiine of the
sale. In fact, he had even forgotten the name of one of
them who was the most skilled and competent of them
all. The trial court said also that he believed Nephi Hansen wanted to salvage son1ething out of the property,
although the evidence showed at that time that Nephi
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Hansen after the sale got les8 than he was getting
before the sale. In contradiction to that the court then
said he thought that "\Villimn L. Hansen wanted to save
the property for the family, when the eYidencP showed
that the family were getting nothing from it except the
meager salary of Nephi Hansen for forty hours of work
a week, and that Lewis Hansen, a son of Nephi and a
brother of "\Y. L., was the instigator of the whole lawsuit. The court said the deed ''should be set aside on
the ground that "\Yill Hansen and the father both were
attempting to save this thing for ~Ir. Hansen", (T. 436);
that the company could have put it in the hands of a
real estate company, and that there was a collusive arrangement between William Hansen and Nephi Hansen,
although there was not one word of evidence of any
such collusive arrangement, nor one word of evidence
that W. L. Hansen ever did anything except make a bid
in accordance with the price fixed by experts for a rundown, failing property.
This case, as we have indicated, was decided against
us before it had hardly commenced. As one ground of
deciding against William L. Hansen was eliminated,
another was advanced by the trial court. The record
shows that the trial court first announced that Nephi
Hansen was under the influence of Bill Hansen ; then
that Nephi Hansen was determined to save the property for himself, and Bill helped him. Thus, Bill would
be under the influence of Nephi; then that there was a
collusive arrangement to save it for the Hansen family.
The court's reasons are so at variance with each other
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and so contradictory that we can gain only one conclusion from them, and that is that regardless of the facts
we were doomed from the day we stepped into the court
room.
The record shows without contradiction, as we have
already indicated, that this company was in failing circumstances; that it was heavily in debt; that it could
not pay its bills; that the principal payments on the
mortgage were way in arrears; that the property was
disintegrating and producing no profit; that the company had lost all of its other properties merely for
their proportionate amount of the mortgage; that Nephi
Hansen was the only stockholder who took any interest
in the property; that he could not refinance his obligations; that he couldn't raise money for needed repairs
and maintenance; that these matters had all been discussed long before the transaction in question here.
There was no help to be secured from anyone to save this
property.
In 1939 the board of directors authorized, ''Exhibit
1 '', the president and secretary to sell all or any part
of the real estate at public or private sale upon the best
terms obtainable and to deliver deeds which shall be final
and to apply the proceeds on the mortgage. Under this
authorization, and without any objection on the part
of any stockholder the company sold the Southeast Furniture and the Granite :Mart properties for the bare
amount of the mortgage. We learn from the testimony
of the secretary, Clyde Hansen, that regardless of this
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resolution these sales were approved by the directors.
The directors had the right to sell all of the property
of the company without the consent of the stockholders
under the Articles of Incorporation. These stockholders
when they became stockholders were charged with knowledge of the fact that the board of directors could sell
the property without their consent, and by becoming
stockholders they agreed to this provision. Under our
statute the board of directors may sell all of the property
of the corporation if the Articles so provide.
''When the Articles of Incorporation provide that the property of the corporation may be
sold, * * * by the directors, * * * sales, made in
accordance therewith shall be binding upon the
company.'' 18-2-16, U. C. A.1943.
This may be done even by a solvent corporation.
''but the directors of the solvent corporation may sell all its property without the consent
of its stockholders, where such sale is expressly
authorized by the charter." 13 Am. Jur. 923.
Even without charter authorization the directors of
this failing company had the right to sell all of its property.
•'By the weight of authority, in the absence
of statute requiring consent of the stockholders,
the directors of the corporation in failing circumstances may sell either part or all of the corporSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

116

ate property without the consent of the stockholders.'' 13 Am. Jur 923.
To the same effect is Fletcher, Volume 2, page 2156 at
2158·:
"while there is no question but that minority
stockholders cannot object where the corporation is insolvent or is doing a losing business or
can no longer make a reasonable profit, there is
no objection to a corporation's selling out at any
time for any good reason provided there is no
fraud or misconduct on the part of the officers or
majority stockholders.''
See also Ballantine on Corporations, 1946, p. 667, to the
effect that if a corporation is insolvent or in failing
condition, the board of directors have authority to sell
the entire assets, and there is no obligation resting on
a corporation to pursue its business when it becomes
evident that the enterprise will in all probability result
in a loss. This is true whether the minority shareholders
object or not, and even if there is a grossly unfair or
fraudulent sale of assets, the right to equitable relief
by rescission will not be granted where there is lach,es
or a delay during which conditions have changed, so that
undue hardship would be caused by the rescission. Even
if there is an unfair or even fraudulent sale the courts
tend to give small minority stockholders compensation
in rnoney rather than upset a transfer which would be
unjust to others by way of rescission. (Ballatine, p. 674,
675).
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In fact, Ballantine states that in case of a sale of
the entire assets· •wide latitude is allowed to the discretion of
the management and the majority. This is particularly true where the disposition of the assets is made to third parties rather than to the
majority themselves, * * *. In general, as we
have seen, courts refuse to review the motives of
the majority or the fairness or expediency of
these fundrunental changes at the suit of minority sharesholders, on the ground that they are
questions of business policy and judgment on
which the majority shareholders have the right
of determination. It can hardly be said that majority shareholders are fiduciaries in making
these decisions as they are entitled to decide, if
they act in good faith, acoording to their own enlightened self int,erest." Ballantine, p. 712.
(Italics added)
The undisputed evidence shows that the transactions involving the Southeast Furniture and Granite
Mart properties were consummated without objection
from anyone, stockholders or dierctors, and that the defendant, W. L. Hansen, knew of these transactions and
the method by which they were accomplished. Early in
1945 W. L. Hansen was contacted by his mother and
father, Nephi J. Hansen, to try and save the remaining
assets of the company-the property in question. After
investigation he made the corporation an offer. At that
time the mortgage was delinquent, and there was still
due upon it $74,500.00 principal. W. L. Hansen made
the corporation an offer of $10,000.00 cash, subject to
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the mortgage. Several directors' meetings were held.
The company had the offer under consideration for more
than six weeks. Clyde Hansen, the secretary, conferred
·with numerous individuals. W. L. Hansen also conferred
with numerous individuals concerning the sale. Nephi
Hansen had already tried to refinance the property and
knew intimately and exactly its worth and condition. He
had the letter from Mr. Harding, the executive secretary of the Real Estate Board. Bill Hansen also had the
information as to .Mr. Harding's opinion, and also the
opinion of S. R. Nielson. After thes·e efforts, investigations and meetings, the final meeting was held at
which W. L. Hansen was not present, nor had he been
present at any other directors' meetings. The board of
directors was filled. The offer was accepted, and the
deed was authorized. The company had the advice of
competent legal counsel. There is no dispute in the
record that there was a meeting of the directors. Even
Lew Hansen admitted this. The overwhelming evidence
is to the ·effect that there was a meeting of the board
of directors at which the new directors were elected
and the deed authorized. A resolution was adopted, and
there is no dispute in the record that this resolution
signed by all of the directors was given to the attorney
for the defendant, W. L. Hansen, by the secretary, and
the money was paid by the attorney to the president
of the company. The secretary delivered the deed to
W. L. Hansen July 28, 1945, and it was recorded the
same day. This was more than a week after the meeting
of the directors. If there had been anything irregular
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in the election of directors or in the meeting, which
there was not, W. L. Hansen knew nothing about it; had
nothing to do with filling the vacancies on the board, and
nothing to do with the action of the board. He paid
his money to the person who had been operating the
property for a quarter of a century without objection
on the part of any stockholder. No one had more right
to receive the purchase money on behalf of the company
than did its president, Nephi J. Hansen. The stockholders, including these plaintiffs, had held him out to
the public as their agent and representative all through
the years. Both checks for payment of the purchase
money were made to the Granite Holding Company and
delivered to the president of the company. There was
no one else to whom these checks could have been delivered or to whom payment could have heen made.
Not only was the sale made to W. L. Hansen 1n
the customary manner in which other sales had been
made, but it was also made, in accordance with the
usual business custon1 of the corporation and was made
by authority of the board of directors. The trial court
says that the hoard of directors was a dummy board
because it was selected by Nephi J. Hansen. It is conceded that Nephi J. Hansen owns the great majority of
the stock of this corporation. In fact, some of the plaintiffs thought that he owned the entire company. As a
majority stockholder, he not only had the power, but
the right to elect any directors he desired. Certainly
no one can successfully contend that a majority of the
stockholders do not have the right to elect directors.
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The Articles of Incorporation here provide that the
directors may fill vacancies, which the directors did do
in this case. The fact that the majority stockholder was
also a director cannot invalidate the election simply
because the dire~were friends or relatives of his.
There is no law -.a requires him to elect enemies or
strangers or people who are not friends. As a matter
of fact, the record does not show that Nephi Hansen
selected the directors, but even had he done so, there
is nothing in the law that prohibits it. Under the Articles
of Incorporation the board of directors had the right to
fill up the board, which they did. The board was lawfully constituted. Some inference has been made that
because the deed is dated July 16 and the resolution
authorizing it July 18, the deed is invalid. That does
not follow at all. The deed itself is a warranty deed by
which this corporation warranted its right to sell the
property. The deed itself recites that it was done by
resolution of the hoard of directors. With these recitals it was delivered to the defendant, W. L. Hansen,
12 days later. Even had the meeting been held on the
18th, it would have been merely a ratification of the deed.
The board can ratify action previously taken if it is
within the powers of the corporation. Clyde Hansen,
however, cleared up this discrepancy and testified positively that the deed was signed after the board of diretors' meeting, and that the date, .July 16, on the deed
is a mistake, (T. 285, 287). Be that as it may, W. L.
Hansen was not required to question the warranty and
verification in the deed itself nor the resolution. The
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deed had been executed and the resolution pa~~ed when
the deed wa~ delivered to him. Even had Nephi Hansen
sold the property without a 1neeting of the board of
directors, tmder the authority of Exhibit 1 these stockholders could not complain because the thing was done
in accordance with the usual custom of doing business.
Xor can these stockholders complain or contend that
there was no meetin or that the directors signed the
minutes individually. Nor can these stockholders contend that the directors were not de jure directors. The
authorities are uniform that de facto directors may bind
the corporation in favor of third persons, and that a corporation may act by means of an officer de facto as
regards third persons as fully and effectually as if the
officers were de jure in all matters within the scope of
the corporate business. (Fletcher, Volume 3, p. 3039)
Under modern authorities there is no question that
the board of directors may delegate the transaction of
business to any number less than the whole board and
may clothe the smaller number with the entire authority
of the whole board. The directors have the power with
out statutory authority to delegate not only ordinary
and routine business, but business requiring the highest
degree of judginent and discretion, 13 Am. Jur., 924.
~)25. Ballantine states the modern rule as follows:
''As presidents of corporations very frequently
exercise, with the knowledge and tacit asquiesence of the directors, wider powers than those
given them by the articles and by-laws of the
corporation, court~ recognizing this fact, haYe
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usually adopted a very liberal rule in favor of
persons contracting with such officers, whenever there was evidence reasonably tending to
show that it had been the custom for the president
or other officer to exercise such powers.'' Ballantine, p. 140, citing cases from Iowa, Minnesota
and Wisconsin.
Where there is a custom for the directors to act separately and not as a board, the corporation and the stockholders are estopped to deny the validity of their action.
''In other words, 'a corporation, its board of di.
rectors and shareholders, may waive any necessity of a meeting of its board of directors for the
transaction of the business of the company.
* * * by permitting the directors to establish a
habit or usage of assenting separately to the
making and performance of contracts by their
agents. By permitting such usages or habits to
be formed by a long course of business, they
adopt and become bound by them, so long as
they acquiesce. If this were not so, great injustice
might be done to parties contracting with them
in their usual way.' '' Fletcher, Volume 3, p.
3049.

Holy Cr:o<Ss Gold Miming & "M!illi:tng Co. vs. Good!wiln,
(Colo.) 1924, 223 Pac. 58 for instance cites the rule as
follows:
''a board of directors may act individually and
the act be binding on the corporation if it has
become a practice of the directors to act that
way.'' Citing C. J. and Thompson on Corporations.
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Even had there been no 1neeting of the board, which
there was, it is undisputed that it was not the custom
to hold directors' rneetings, and this had continued over
a long period, so that these plaintiffs as stockholders
could not have objected to the directors approving this
transaction individually. However, there was a meeting
at which the action was taken, and it is immaterial when
the minutes were signed. In its business with W. L. Hansen this corporation did more than it usually did. However, even if the action had been as contended by the
plaintiffs it is still valid because it would be in accordance
with the usual custom and business. All the plaintiffs
testified that Nephi Hansen always managed the corporation as his own, and that to this they made no objection.
Lew Hansen is the only person who raises any
question about the meeting of the board. Even he admits
there was a meeting. The minutes recite that there was
a meeting, and the rule is :
''whenever an act purports to have been done or
authorized by the board of directors, it will be
presumed, until the contrary is shown, that they
acted at a meeting, that proper notice of the
meeting was given to all the directors, that a)
quorum of the directors was present, that the
meeting was held and conducted in accordance
with any special provision in the charter or by
laws, and that the act was done or authorized by
a 1najority, etc.'' Fletcher, Yolume 3, p. 3077.
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This is particularly true when the minutes of the corporation also recite that the meeting was held.
If this were not the rule no one could safely do
business with a corporation. Fletcher also says, Volume
3, p. 3100, 3101, that a corporation is bound by the apparent authority it gives its officers; that because a
large part of the business of the country is carried on
by corporations it is the practice to deal with their
agents, and that ''the authority of an agent to do certain acts in behalf of his principal may be inferred from
the continuance of the acts themselves over such a period
of time and the doing of them in such a manner that the
principal would naturally have become cognizant of
them and would have forbidden them, if unauthorized."
p. 3104. The public is compelled to rely upon the apparent authority of the officers of the corporation, and
if over the years they have done certain acts as the one
in question, the corporation ''is bound thereby to the
same extent as if authority were conferred in the most
formal manner.'' Apparent authority does not require
any formal resolutions, and if there is apparent power,
then actual power is immaterial so far as liability of
the corporation- is concerned, p. 3105. Missouri states
the rule as follows, according to Fletcher at p. 3114:
"a customary act by an official may be treated
as valid and within the exercise of an actual
authority, not necessarily because the company
is estopped to deny its validity from having inYested the officer with apparent authority to perSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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form it, but because the inference can be drawn
that he was, in truth, authorized."
And according to Fletcher, even in ~linnesota where it
is held that knowledge is necessary when apparent
authority is relied on, it is not necessary to have knowledge in order for the authority of the agent to be implied, p. 3115. Fletcher also say~ at pages 3204 and
3205:
'• Furthern1ore, the president may have all the
powers of the board of directors where they
abandon the management of the corporation and
leave the conduct of its business to him. Thus, if
the president is in full charge of the corporation, and has been permitted by both stockholders
and directors for a long time to exercise unrestrained control, he has prima facie authority
'* * *. ::Moreover, if the corporation is in effect a
one-man corporation, and the directors have held
no meetings for years, and such one man is the
president who absolutely dominates, manages and
controls its property and affairs as his own, any
contract made by him is binding on the corporation.''
A point was made that the president did not turn
the purchase money into the corporation. That is no
argument against W. L. Hansen. He paid the money
to the president of the corporation, with checks payable
to the company, and what became of the money afterwards is no concern of his.
"It is no defense that the officer misappropriated
the money and that the corporation never reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ceived any benefit from the loan." Chestrvut
Street Trust & 8avings Fwnd Co. vs. Reoord Publishing Oo., 75 A. 1067.
As a rnatter of fact, the corporation did get the benefit
of this money. The resolution, exhibit "D", recites that
the corporation owed Nephi Hansen back salary which
he settled with the corporation for the amount of
$5,000.00. There is no dispute that the corporation did
- owe this money, and salary is a preferred debt. The
record also shows without dispute that $1200.00 of the
remaining $5,000.00 went to pay corporate obligations.
The balance of $3,800.00 was represented by the check
of W. L. Hansen payable to the Granite Holding Company and was delivered to the Granite Holding Company.
Certainly, the court had no right to return this
property to the Granite Holding Company and allow it
to keep the purchase money. No case sustains that sort
of thing. Nor can these stockholders complain that it
was not paid to the corporation when it was paid to
the individual they permitted.to do all their business for
a quarter of a century - the individual they held out
to the public as the proper one to represent them and to
conduct all of the corporate business.
The deed was the valid act of the corporation. It
was authorized at a meeting of the board of directors
legally constituted, as provided for in the Articles of
Incorporation, acting with authority given them by the
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ity, and there is no evidence whatever that the n1eeting
was not held. Even had there been no meeting and had
the directors signed individually, and had they been
only de facto directors, their act still binds the corporation, as we have pointed out. Under any view, the deed
was the valid act of the corporation and transferred
title to ,V. L. Hansen. The deed itself warrants the
title of the company and the regularity of the proceedings and recites that it was properly given by resolution of the board of direetors. The defendant needed to
go no further than the deed so far as the corporation
is concerned. The defendant had no part in the issuance
of the deed and no part in the proceedings leading up
to it, and these stockholders, in view of their past conduct, their asquiescence and inaction, cannot now as
against W. L. Hansen say the deed is not valid.
(B)

These Stockholders Have No Cause of Action
Against W. L. Hansen

There is a well known principle of law that without
any other and standing alone is fatal to the plaintiffs'
entire case herein. It is settled without dispute''A stockholder cannot maintain a bill in
equity to set aside an act or transaction which
was done irregularly or illegally, but which a
majority of the stockholders are entitled to do
regularly or legally. Nor can a stockholder sue to
set aside a transaction on the ·part of the directors on the ground that it was fradulent, irregular, illegal or in excess of the powers conferred
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upon the directors, where the transaction is within the powers of the corporation, and such, therefore, as a majority of the stockholders may ratify,
unless, as may sometimes be the case, it is impossible to procure a meeting of the stockholders
to pass upon the transaction.'' Fletcher, Volume
6, pages 6899, 6900.
This is just common sense. The majority of stockholders could have authorized or later ratified this
transaction. The corporation had the power to sell the
property. Likewise, even had there been no meetings of
the board of dir·etors, the stockholders could have ratified
Exhibit "D". The principle just stated is the corollary of
another principle that courts of equity do not seek to
do useless things. Of what avail this entire litigation~
The property has been returned to the Granite Holding
Company which is still controlled by the ma:jority stockholders. They can still do exactly what already has been
done. They can still sell the property to W. L. Hansen,
and this entire lawsuit is a complete futility. Another
complexity in this case is that the court has returned the
property to Nephi J. Hans·en and allowed him to keep the
$10,000.00 and has given him a judgment for $30,000.00,
and at the same time stated that his fraud was responsible
for the original transaction and the basis for the rescission. Nothing could be more absurd and when it
is done in the nan1e of equity it is astounding. How
these stockholders are to benefit

b~·

this judgment does

not appear and is beyond our imagination to conjecture. As above indicated, these plaintiffs have not been
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injured because the Inajority can
already has been done.

~till

do exactly what

\Ye have n1ade no atte1npt in this brief to do more
than cite elenwntary priciples, recognized so far as we
are able to determine by all the text writers and authorities. A~ already stated, we have fonnd no case that
would justify the action of the trial court herein under
the facts present. There are certain principles of law
that prevent majority stockholders from using the corporation to defraud minority stockholders, but even
those rules of law require the minority stockholders to
bring themselves within the principles of applicable law.
The right is not unlimited, and there is nothing in the
law that prevents majority stockholders or directors
from acting as stated by Ballantine, supra, in their
own enlightened self interest. In other words, majority
stockholders have the right to conduct the business of
the corporation as they see fit, provided they act in
good faith, and minority stockholders have no right to
complain of action of the majority merely because such
action may be in the interest of the majority. The Ininority stockholders cannot run the corporation. They cannot elect the directors. They cannot control the management.
.Jfinority stockholders or any

stockholder~

for that

matter must bring themselves within well recognized
and established rules in order to rescind a deed given
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by the corporation. As we have shown, they must restore the defendant to the status quo.
''Certainly the plaintiff will not be allowed to
derive any unconscionable advantage from the
cancellation, and usually he will be denied relief
when it is not possible substantially to restore the
defendant to the status quo. The mere inability
of the plaintiff to make restoration does not relieve him of his obligation to do so, or permit the
court to grant him relief.'' 9 Am. J ur., p. 384.
The fact that these plaintiffs hold some preferred
stock does not change their status. Preferred stockholders are not creditors of the corporation. They are
merely stockholders with a preferred right to dividends.
Fletcher, Volume 6, p. 6012, Ballantine, p. 503.
The cases where minority stockholders may resort
to the courts as stated above are limited. They cannot
question the act of the majority unless the acts are(1) ultra vires; (2) illegal, or (3) fraudulent. Stated
in another way, a court will not interfere in the suit
in regard to matters intra vires, unless there is fraud
or oppression. "The majority rules" is the basic rule
as to the internal affairs of the corporation so far as
the acts of the corporation are within its express or implied powers. It is of no moment that the acts of the
majority are unwise or inexpedient so long as they act
in good faith, Fletcher, Volume 6, pages 6797, 6798. In
the case at bar the acts were not ultra vires, as we have
shown, but even had they been ultra vires, these plaintiffs cannot complain. It is well settled that even an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

131

ultra Yires contract with a corporation cannot be set
aside if it has been fully perfonned on both sides.
••"\Yhen an ultra vires contract with a corporation has been fully performed on both sides,
neither party can 1naintain an action to set aside
the transaction or to recover what has been parted with.·· Fletcher, Y olume 3, p. 2631, Ballantine,
p. 247.
Also a majority of the courts hold that the party who
has received benefits from the performance is estopped
to set up that the contrdct is ultra vires.

_r:

"ffitra vires" is applied to an act that is beyond
the scope of the specified corporate business. An illegal
act is one that is contrary to some public policy, or statutory regulation. Ballantine, pages 246, 247. The giving
of the deed was not an ultra vires act, nor was it an illegal act. The contract having been fully executed on
both sides, these plaintiffs cannot raise the question of
ultra vires, nor the question of illegality, as above indicated. They are thus left with only one ground, and
that is that the deed was fr~dulent.
All of these directors were stockholders. None of
them profited personally from this transaction, unless
it can be said that Nephi J. Hansen profited personally.
He got $5,000.00 which the corporation owed him for
salary. He had a right to this. He was later employed
h~- W. L. Hansen at a less salary than he had been receiving from the corporation. He had complete authority
before the sale over the propert~-. He had no authority
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over it after the sale. The only question is what became
of the $3,800.00, and as we have already pointed out,
that is a matter between Nephi Hansen and the corporation. It is no concern of the defendant, W. L. Hansen,
who had no control whatever over either the corporation,
its president or its money. The record fails to show
how this sale deprived the minority stockholders of anything. Had the property continued as it had been
managed in the past, it would have gone for the amount
of the mortgage. Stockholders never received anything
from prior sales, and they did....r receive an extinquishment of Nephi Hansen's debt and other debts of the
corporation by this sale in addition to the amount of
the mortgage.
The trial court found that the corporation was the
alter ego of Nephi Hansen. While the corporation was
controlled and managed by Nephi Hansen, it was not
his alter ego under any of the authorities. In order to
be his alter ego it must appear that Nephi J. Hansen
owned all or substantially all of the outstanding shares
of the Granite Holding Company, or that the persons
in whose name such shares stand held the same in trust
for him, Geary vs. Oaixn, 79 Utah 268, 273, 9 Pac. (2)
396. If this corporation had been the alter ego of Nephi
Hansen, these stockholders certainly could not complain
because they wouldn't have been stockholders. Nephi
Hansen and the corporation would have been identical,
and if the corporation was the alter ego of Nephi Hansen,
he had a right to do with his property as he saw fit
except as to the rights of creditors. As we have shown,
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these plaintiffs are not creditors, nor was the corporation the alter ego of Nephi J. Hansen. Even though the
finding of the court that the corporation was the alter
ego of Nephi J. Hansen destroys the entire case for the
plaintiffs, we still do not wish to rely upon that error
of the court.
~\s

indica ted above, there was no personal advantage
to these directors at the expense of the stockholders by
reason of the sale to W. L. Hansen. Even a stockholder
or director might have purchased the property instead
of \Y. L. Hansen and still not have been liable in a suit
for rescission, provided there was no fraud or unfair
dealing, Fletcher, Volume 6, p. 6842. So plaintiffs must
show that the transaction was fraudulent, and the only
evidence that they can point to is the evidence of Mr.
Keipe and the finding of the court that at the time of
the sale the property was worth $100,000.00, and that
is was not sold by a real estate company through solicitation for bids. The plaintiffs failed to allege or prove
that at the time of the sale there were other persons
willing to pay more for the property than it was sold for.
This itself, as we will point out in a moment, is fatal
to their case if based on the ground of inadequate consideration. Aside from that, is the question of their own
laches, estoppel, possibility of ratification and general
uselessness of this lawsuit. Coming, however, to the
question of consideration, nothing is better settled than
the rule that inadequacy of price, standing alone, with
nothing else to support the charge of fraud and collusion, is not in itself any evidence of fraud and is not
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sufficient to set aside a sale, 13 Am. Jur pages 1114,
1115. This court in the case of U t;ah Assets Corporation
vs. Do,oley Brot.he.rs Association, 92 Utah 577, 586, 70
Pac. (2) 738, quotes with approval from Wait on Fraudulent Conveyances, as follows:
''Mere proof of inadequacy of price by itself has been considered insufficient to implicate
the vendee in the fraudulent intent or to impeach
his good faith, and indequacy of consideration,
unless extremely gross, does not per se prove
fraud. It must appear that the price was so manifestly inadequate as to shock the moral sense and
create in the mind at once, upon its being mentioned, a suspicion of fraud.''
In that case this court pointed out that while the experts
had said that the value of the property might be as much
as $25,000.00 and others had said that it was not worth
more than $10,000.00, the fact was that it would not
sell for more than $12,500.00; that was the highest price
at which it would actually sell, so the court refused to
set aside even at the instance of a creditor, who was in
a far stronger position than these plaintiffs, a sale of
the property for $10,000.00. 'The difference between
$10,000.00 and $12,500.00 is 25·% of the purchase price
of the property. That was not sufficient to establish
fraud. In the case at bar there was no offer whatever of
$100,000.00 for this property. The only person shown
by the record who was willing to take the property was
the defendant, W. L. Hansen, and he paid $10,000.00 and
assumed a $74,500.00 mortgage, knowing that he would
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''

have to expend many thousands of dollars in addition
in order to make the property pay. Aside from the
fact that there was no offer of $100,000.00, it is apparent from the findings of the court that the corporation would not have received $100,000.00 because the
trial court wanted the property sold through a real
estate company which would have charged a commission of 5%, or $5,000.00 in order to sell the property
for $100,000.00, leaving a ficticious net of $95,000.00,
and a theoretical and ficticious profit to the corporation of $10,000.00, or silghtly more than 9%, over
and above what it actually received from the defendant, W. L. Hansen.
Under the theory adopted by the trial court this
property could never be sold so long as the trial court
did not agree with the judgment of the board of directors.
In other words, the trial court assumed that he had the
right to control this corporation against the wishes and
desires of the majority stockholders and the board of
directors. We know of no rule of law that permits this
to be done. There was no evidence whatever that in
1945 this property would have sold for $100,000.00.
This property sold for the highest offer that was made
for it. This sale price was upon the basis of the judgment of the executive secretary of the Salt Lake Real
Estate Board and its Board of Appraisers, and the
judgment of the Executive Vice-President of one of the
largest banks in the intermountain country whose special
business it is to value property not from a theoretical
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point of view, but from what it would produce. As
against these two men who made their examination at
the time of the sale, the court took the opinion of a man
who did not appraise the property until three years
after the sale when extensive improvements had been
made, who did not go inside but merely looked at it from
the outside, and who at the conclusion of his testimony
admitted that if the property was not producing a
profit, it was worthless. We submit that neither law,
equity, good conscience or morals justifies the action
of the trial court in this case. Where the price of property is fixed upon the basis of an independent appraisal
by competent and disinterested persons, it can never be
subject to the charge of fraud.
"where a sale is necessary because of the exigencies of the case, the fact that the property
is sold for less than its value does not of itself
show fraud on the part of the majority stockholders as against the minority." Fletcher, Volume 6. p. 6804.
This property was sold for all it was worth at the time
of sale.
This suit was not c01nmenced until 17 months after
the sale. It was then commenced by one who has no
standing whatever in equity and has since been dismissed fron1 the case. The additional plaintiffs were
added two years

aft~er

the sale, with the exception

of William Young who was added three years after.
In the meantime, the defendant, W. L. Hansen, had
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proceeded to spend hi~ own nwney on the property, he
had made agreen1ents with tenant~ to n1ake greater
improYements, and his position had been materially
changed. These stockholders had not only remained
silent and acquiescent throughout the years concerning the methods by which the business was transacted
and the corporation operated and thus lulled the public
into a belief that Nephi J. Hansen was the proper person to represent the company, but they had also waited
to bring this action until \Y. L. Hansen had substantially
changed his position. Under this state of facts the rule
18:

· •Even when a stockholder would otherwise be
entitled to maintain a suit in equity under the
principles stated in the preceding sections, his
right to relief may be barred by laches, or he may
be estopped to complain by reason of acquiescence,
consent or participation in the acts complained of.
The essential basis of all these is equitable estoppel.'' Fletcher, Volume 6, p. 6948.
They cannot be heard to say that they did not know
because they are required to know when seeking to
place at a disadvantage a third person who has dealt
with the corporation as they, the stockholders, have
led the public to believe is proper.
''There must be knowledge, but knowledge
may be presumed from opportunity to know. * * *
No fixed time can be defined beyond which delay
will amount to laches. It is a question of fact,
and the intervention of rights is an important
test.'' Fletcher, Y olume 6, pages 6950, 6951.
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As already stated, Lewis Hansen, the original plaintiff,
was estopped to bring the action and it should have
been dismissed. He had no right to sue on behalf
of himself and other stockholders. Fletcher, Volume 6,
p. 6955. When the new plaintiffs were brought in,
there had been such a material alteration of status
on the part of Bill Hansen that they should have been
denied access to equity. 9 Am. J ur, 353, Sec. 5, 384, Sec.
39, 388, 'Sec. 44 and 45; Ballantine, 361, 67 4, 675.
A very illuminating case and one that discusses
many of the principles with which we are here concerned is Smith vs. Stone, (Wyo. 1912) supra, 123 Pac.
612. In that case action was brought to avoid a sale
of the assets of the corporation. It was claimed that
the sale by the corporation was to a second corporation
which was controlled by the same officers and stockholders and for an inadequate consideration, and that by
reason thereof the sale was fraudulent and void. The Supreme Court of Wyoming discuss·ed the applicable principles, most of which are relevant in this case. There it
was alleged that the property had a value of $125,000.00
and was sold for $7·6,500.00. The court held that a bill
founded upon fraud or misconduct which does not allege
with certainty and definiteness tangible facts to sustain
its general averments of such fraud and misconduct is
insufficient and cannot he sustained. The court also
called attention to the fact that it was not alleged or
proved that any greater price than $76,500.00 could have
been obtained, either at public or private sale; that
no one had offered or was willing to pay more for it.
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Therefore, it was a matter of corporate policy and
manage1nent as to the price at which the land would be
sold, and that the mere discrepancy between the alleged
value of the land and the purchase price wasn't any
proof of fraud. The court further said that a minority
stockholder cannot be aided by the court to control the
action of the directors and themselves be allowed to fix
the price. The court also stated that the action could.
not be sustained because there was no offer to refund
the purchase price: that the action was not for the benefit of the stockholder, but for the benefit of the corporation; that the stockholder does not bring the suit because
his rights have been directly violated or because the
cause of action is his, and that he may be ·estopped where
he has participated or acquiesced in the conduct of
the corporation or failed for an unreasonable time
to take steps to set the deed aside. The company there
was heavily indebted, and the Wyoming court called
attention to the fact that a minority stockholder cannot prevent the sale of all of the property of the corporation when the corporation is an unprofitable and
failing enterprise, citing Cook on Corporations and
Noyes on Intercorporate Relations. The fact that the
two corporations had the same officers and stockholders
did not prevent them from dealing with each other,
and the mere fact that there might have been an inadequate consideration was not sufficient to charge either
corporation with fraud.
To the effect that a director cannot deny the legality
of a directors' meeting at which he was present and in
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which he participated, see St,ate Exrel Blackwood vs.
Brast, 127 '8. E. 507, (W. V.).

On the question of these stockholders lack of standing in equity see, also O.rme vs. Salt River Valley Water
Users Association, (Ariz.) 1923, 217 Pac. 935, 940:

''long-continued acquiescence in a course of conduct by one interested in it, especially when the
rights of others are affected thereby, will induce the courts to refuse him relief upon his
subsequent complaint of it."
and Buchwald Tr(J;(YIJsfer Oo. vs. H,urst, 111 Maryland 572,
19 Am. English Annotated Cases, 619 and Note which
holds that the corporation cannot complain that the
president who exercised entire control over the affairs
of the corporation used the money from a mortgage for
his own benefit, and that where directors held no meetings the courts would not relieve the corporation where
innocent persons are likely to be made to suffer, and
if corporations permit officers to exercise such control over its affairs as an individual does his own, it
cannot deny the authority of its officers.
''To allow a person publicly to proclaim himself
authorized to act in a certain capacity, and to seek
to avoid his acts when such avoidance would
work to the advantage of the corporation, would
be but to authorize the perpetration of frauds on
an unsuspecting community.''
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In the Note at page 625 the cases are collected under
the following:
•'The power of the president of a corporation
to sell or mortgage its property may be inferred
from the manner in which the business of the
corporation is conducted with the knowledge and
acquie:scenee of the corporation or its directors.''
Although the deed was not executed prior to the
meeting of the board of directors, even had the resolution been adopted subsequent to the execution of the
deed the corporation could not here complain because
directors may ratify any act of one of their own number that they could have authorized in the first instance, and directors at a regular and legal meeting
may ratify a contract or act done or authorized by
them at an illegal meeting, and thus render it valid,
Fletcher, Volume 4, p. 3395.

A FEW OF THE UTAH CASES
This court in an early case, Sirnger vs. Salt Lake
Copper IIIOJnufactvwring Co., 17 Utah 143, 155, held in line
with the authorities that where meetings of the directors
have been held and business transacted the presumption
is that such meeting was regularly called and held for
the transaction of such business, and that where the
validity of an act done at the meeting of the board is
drawn in question, the burden is on the party attacking
to show that such meeting was not held or that it was
irregular. The only person questioning the meeting
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

142
is Lewis Hansen, and he doesn't question the fact that
a meeting was held at which the sale of the property was
decided. He only questions the time as to which he
signed the minutes which is entirely immaterial since
he did in fact sign them and cannot now attempt to
repudiate his conduct upon which another has already
acted.
We briefly refer to a few of the other Utah cases
announcing principles applicable to the case at barSkeen vs. Warren Irrigation Co., 42 Utah 602, 132 Pac.
1.162, holding that an act authorized by the charter cannot be ultra vires, and that a court of equity will not
interfere with the management of the corporation or
with the determination of matters of policy made by the
board of directors; that minority stockholders cannot
control the discretion of corporate directors. In
the absence of fraud courts of equity will not interefere
with the suit of the dissatisfied minority merely to overrule and control the discretion of the directors on questions of corporate policy or business.

Smith vs. K naJUSs, 52 Utah 614, 176 Pac. 621, that
an officer of the corporation participating in a meeting
is estopped to question the regularity of the meeting or
the legality of actions taken thereat .
.Beggs vs. Myton Oa;n;al & Irrigation Co., 54 Utah
120, 179 Pac. 984, to the effect that when the Articles of
Incorporation provide that the property ma:Y be sold
by the directors or by the stockholders, sales so made
will be binding on the corporation, and that failing or
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unsuccessful corporations n1ay sell and dispose of their
property provided only the transactions are not on fraud
of creditors. There is no question in thf\ case at bar
of the rights of creditors.
Carlquist rs. Q·uayle, 62 Utah 266, 218 Pac. 729,
holding that authority of officers of a corporation may
be implied fron1 conduct and acquiescence and that express authority is not indispensible under such circumstances, but if a corporation did not repudiate within
a reasonable time even if the transaction was unauthorized, it would be held to have been ratified.

This court in Ellis.on vs. Pingree, 64 Utah 468, 477,
231 Pac. 826, quotes with approval Page on Contracts
as to the definition of duress. Duress, however, was apparently abandoned by the trial court as a basis for
holding against the defendant, so we will discuss that
question no further other than to say that no reasonable
mind could spell duress from any part of this record.

(C) The Filndings of Fact, Oonclus~ons 'of Law
and Judgment

The findings of fact disclose that these stockholders
knew of the manner in which the corporation was run;
that Nephi J. Hansen operated it without meetings; that
there were no books and records. In fact, the findings
assert that Nephi refused to give any information to
the stockholders, and that he treated and acted towards
the corporation as if it were his own property. Had the
findings stated the additional fact that this was all done
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without protest or objection by the stockholders, such
findings would have been a complete defense to this
action, as we have indicated at length heretofore. The
findings hold that Nephi never made any accounting
to the stockholders with respect to the affairs or money
of the corporation; that the Articles were amended to
provide for the preferred stock 26 years before the
transaction in question, and that no dividends were
paid to the stockholders on account of the preferred
stock, and that Nephi Hansen refused to account to them
''except to assure them that everything was in good
hands and being properly taken care of." We have
looked in vain in the evidence for any support for the
statement we have just expressed in quotation marks.
According to the plaintiffs one of them never talked 0
Nephi Hansen at all, while Nephi Hansen according to
another one told him some 10 or 15 years ago that there
was nothing left except his salary, and if there was
anything left that it would go to his family, and the third
never talked to Nephi at all and said he couldn't get
anything out of him. The findings purport to describe
the property in question, but are silent as to its condition. There is nothing in the findings to show that the
property was badly run down and disintgrating, and
that it could not pay operating expenses. Nor is there
anything in the findings that prior to this sale, as shown
by Exhibits 2, 3 and 4, the income was far less than it
was after the sale and after the defendant had spent
his own money in making substantial and valuable inlprovements and had by his own efforts and by obliSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~

gating hilnselt' for heayy expen~e~ secured inereasPs in
rents. The findings state that Xephi J. Hansen eansed
vacancies to be filled in the board of director8. There is
nothing in the evidence t 1: at ~ e phi Hansen did this.
Exhibit "D'~ says that the board of directors filled the
vacancies. Even had N" ephi Hansen filled the vacancies,
we know of nothing that prohibits hiin fron1 doing so
where he is the 1najority stockholder, nor do we know
of anything that requires hiln to eliminate members
of his family fro1n the board of directors. The findings
recite that Nephi Hansen caused the property to be
deeded to his son and caused the board of directors to
adopt the resolution. This is entirely contrary to the
record. The record shows that the board of directors
acted and not Nephi Hansen alone. However, even had
Xephi Hansen acted alone, under the authorities we
. have heretofore set forth the corporation and these
plaintiffs would be bound because they had held him out
to the public for years as having that authority. The
findings further recite that the corporation never received the money, which is not true. They find that Nephi
Hansen used it for his own purposes, which is not true.
As to what became of $3800.00, we do not know, but
that cannot be held against this defendant, W. L. Hansen. The findings say that the sale was never approved
or ratified by the stockholders, which is immaterial because it was not required to have the stockholders ratify
it. The findings recite that Nephi Hansen dirln 't attempt to obtain offers fron1 any other person nor did
he list the smne with a real estate agent. \'/ e know
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of no rule of law that required him to list it with a
real estate agent, and had he done so, it could only have
resulted in an additional charge against the property.
But it does appear affirmatively that both Nephi Hansen
and Clyde Hansen attempted to refinance the property
and failed, and that they talked to numerous persons,
and secured the advice and services of a competent attorney. There was nothing clandestine or secret about
the thing at all. The findings further state that no
stockholder was ever advised by Nephi Hansen with
respect to the sale. This is not true. All the directors
are stockholders. In fact, Joseph E. Jensen, is shown
by the original articles to be one of the heaviest stockholders, and at the time of his death he was the second
largest stockholder in the corporation. The insignificant
amount of stock owned by these plaintiffs compared to
the total capitalization indicates that so far as the remaining stockholders are concerned they are entirely
indifferent to this suit or else they realize that they are
in no position to complain. The findings recite that
Nephi J. Hansen maintained that the property shall be
taken away from the corporation and become the property of the family of Nephi J. Hansen. Nothing is
further from the fact. The property did not become
the property of the family of Nephi J .. Hansen, and in
truth the findings so show because they immediately
thereafter assert that William L. Hansen in taking the
property did so to keep the complete control thereof
for himself and to insure an income to his father. As
we have already pointed out, Nephi Hansen personally
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lost b)~ tl1e tran~rtction. He lost rontrol of tl1e ll1anag·ement, and he lost in inc01ue. The findings assert that
\Villiam L. Hansen k-new that the 1noney would not be
used for corporate purposes. There is nothing in the
record to support any such allegation. The findings recite that the board of directors was illegally constituted
because they were members of the family of Nephi Hansen or his personal friends. How this constituted illegal.
ity does not appear, and the finding is a conclusion of
law which finds no support in the authorities. The
findings assert that the directors signed the resolution
without any independent knowledge of the facts and
solely in reliance upon statements and informaUon
furnished by Nephi Hansen. Suppose they did rely
upon X ephi Hansen. They had a right to do so, and
unless what he told them is false, they did have information, and they had a right to rely on it. In truth, the
directors knew exactly what was going on. They all
knew that the company was failing. They all knew the
condition of the property. They all knew that it could
not go on as it had done, and that something had to be
done or it would go merely for the amount of the mortgage. The findings assert that the deed to William L.
Hansen was illegal because it was executed July 16 and
recorded July 28. We know of nothing in that recital
that would make it illegal, and that thereafter Nephi
Hansen prepared a resolution dated July 18 which wa~
prepared and signed after that date. There is nothing

in the record to show that Nephi Hansen prepared the
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ever, it is immaterial when it was prepared or signed.
The testimony shows that Clyde Hansen prepared it
from the minutes taken by him and according to Clyde
Hansen the resolution is correct, but there is a mistake
in the date of the deed. The findings state that this was
done in order to falsify the corporate records. How it
would falsify the corporate rec ()rds to have a deed dated
prior to the resolution authorizJng it, is beyond our comprehension. Even had the deec l been given on the 16th
and authorized on the 18th, such authorization would
have been a ratification, as we have heretofore pointed
out in detail. Nor would it be material that the resolution was signed individually, which it was not. If it
was the custom of the corporaf ion to do this, the stockholders may not complain as against a third person.
Even if the directors did sign individually, that would
not be unusual because that's the way they usually
sign minutes. Minutes are not written up and signed
at the time of the meeting. The findings state that the
plaintiffs are not estopped. Had the findings stated the
facts, they would clearly have disclosed not only an
estoppel but laches, and a complete failure of the plaintiffs to bring themselves within any of the rules of equity
authorizing the decision. The court purports to find
as a fact that William L. Hansen took the property as
a trustee for the corporation and that, therefore, he is
liable for all the rents he collected, but not apparently
to be credited with his contributions to the property.
The court should have found how the business had been
managed and conducted all through the years, should
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have found that the corporation had sold other properties in the san1e manner as it had sold this ; that there
was an independent appraisal of this property at the
time of the sale; and that the purchase price was even
more than the independent appraisal; should have shows
that the corporation was failing; that the property was
disintegrating; that none of the plaintiffs had ever
lifted a finger to aid the corporation or to take an interest in its affairs; that they had left its conduct and
management solely to Nephi Hansen without objections,
and that some of them didn't even know what property
it had or where it was. The findings should have shown
that the defendant, William L. Hansen, paid $10,000.00
to the company, and that he had not had it returned.
Then a judgment against plaintiffs would be compelled.
The conclusions and judgment are fantastic. They
conclude that this corporation by making a fraudulent
sale should benefit by the same, keep the money it received, get tht property back with all the improvements
and $30,000.00 in addition. By its own fraud the corpora:tion is changed from a failing activity to one that
has a chance to survive; gets its property improved, and
a judgment against the one who did the improving,
and all this in the name of equity. It is shocking and
against all principles of right and justice.
III.

THE ACCOUNTING WAS WRONG

Black on Rescission, Y olume 3, 1929, has a whole
chapter to the effect that in rescission there must be a
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restitution or restoration of the status quo, commencing
at page 1482:
''Rescission of a contract does not involve
the claim or award of compensation to the injured party on account of fraud or other vice
inherent in the contract, nor does it imply a readjustment of the rights of the parties after a
recognized breach of the contract, but it means
the undoing of the contract, the making of it
as if it had never been. Hence the first and prime
essential of rescission is the 'restitutio in integrum', that is, the restoration of each of the
parties to the position, with reference to his property and his rights, which he occupied immediately before the making of the contract."
This is good sense as well as good law. If this contract
should have been rescinded, which we have shown it
should not have been, then the court should have followed the rule just stated. W. L. Hansen should be accountable only for the reasonable rent of the property
in the condition in which he received it. He is not a
tenant of the vendor, nor is he in the position of having
occupied as a tenant, ''and consequently he is not
chargeable with 'rent', properly so called, but only to
the extent of the benefit actually derived from the use
of the land during his occupation of it. This amount,
however, as it appears from the cases, is usually reckoned as being equivalent to the fair or reasonable rental
value of the land, * * * .But if the improvements were
made by the vendee after taking possession, and the
land had no rental value outside of suc.h improve1nents,
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the vendor will not be entitled to clain1 the value of
the use of the prenrises as so improved, unless perhaps
frOin the date of bringing his suit to rescind.'' Black,
p. 1536. Placing the parties in status quo and charging
the defendant with the rental of the property as he
received it. would not permit the corporation to demand
more rent than the corporation itself was receiving at
the time of the transaction. Exhibit 2 shows that for
the first four n1onths of 19-!5 the corporation received
$7,932.00 as rent, or $1,983.00 a month. The trial court

required the defendant to account from August 1, 1945,
to September 30, 1948, a period of 38 months, which at
the rate of $1,983.00 a month would total $7·5,354.00 instead of the $97,686.00 found by the court. The court
found that William L. Hansen had expended on the
property $68, 439. 95. Before the sale the corporation paid
Nephi Hansen a salary for operating the property. The
trial court disallowed the salary paid Nephi Hansen
by William L. Hansen for doing the same thing. It
should have been allowed. Had the corporation kept
the property it would have paid Nephi Hansen, according to Exhibit 2, approximately $300.00 a month instead
of the $170.00 a month paid him by W. L. Hansen. The
court should also have allowed the other items shown
on Exhibits 7 and 8 because they were all proved. The
court should have credited W. L. Hansen with $79,692.36,
plus $2,412.51, plus his $10,000.00 purchase payment with
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interest for 38 months, plus a reasonable management·
of $400.00 a month, for raising rents and improving the
property and managing it, or a total of $109,204.87, and
required the corporation to pay him $33,850.87 as restitution for the rescission. This would have been in accordance with equity and would have pJaced the parties in
status quo because the corporation has go't its property
back with the rents raised, the property improved, and
the whole enterprise placed where it may eventually get
on a going basis, by the efforts of the defendant, W. L.
Hansen. The corporation could not have done this on
its own account. W. L. Hansen by the expenditure of
his time, efforts, money and skill has done what the corporation could never have done as it was being operated,
and W. L. Hansen cannot be restored to a status quo
without remuneration as indicated. Had the court made
a proper accounting, it would have ended this litigation.
None of these stockholders would be found willing to
advance this sum or any of it, particularly in view of
the small holdings they have compared with the total
capitalization.
What a travesty it is to hold that this corporation
fraudulently disposed of the property, then permit the
corporation to receive the fruits of its fraud. If there
was fraud, which there was not, it was the fraud of
Nephi J. Hansen, and yet Nephi J. Hansen will be the
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chief beneficiary of the judgn1ent of the trial eourt since
he is the principal stockholder, eYen to the extent, so
says the trial court, of being a sufficient owner that
the corporation is his alter ego. Look at the case any
way you will, either Xephi J. Hansen or the corporation itself, which is Nephi J. Hansen, is rewarded by a
court of equity for his fraudulent conduct at the expense
of one who relied upon him.
In fact and in law there should have been no accounting. There should have been no rescission. The
accounting, however, as it was made is entirely erroneous. \Y. L. Hansen was entitled to an allowance for
the cost of keeping and an allowance for the restoration.
He should have been allowed for his improvements and
repairs, for taxes and encumbrances paid, his purchase
money with interest, Black, p.gs. 1538-1544.
The only way William L. Hansen could be a trustee
would be as a constructive trustee by reason of his fraud
and the innocence of the vendor. Even according to the
trial court both parties were pari delicto and consequently should have been left where the court found
them, but certainly there is no case that holds that a
vendor who is guilty of fraud equal to or in excess of
that of the vendee, can hold the vendee as a constructive
trustee for hin1.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

154
CONCLUSION

It, therefore, appears from the record that the original plaintiff, Lewis F. Hansen, had no right to sue.
The case should have been dis1nissed then and that would
have ended it. The other plaintiffs have been guilty
of laches, and they are estopped to question the transaCtion in question. This appears from their own pleadings
and without dispute in the record. It also appears that
the board of directors had the right to do what they
did, and even had they done so irregularly or without
authority, equity will not set aside the transaction because they could have ratified what they did, and equity
will not do a futile thing. However, there was no irregularity or illegality in the transaction. The Articles of
Incorporation gav.e the directors the right to sell the property. They gave the directors a right to fill the board.
The board was filled, the meeting was held, and the transaction authorized and consummated. Even had there
been no meeting of the board, it was in accordance with
long practice to allow Nephi Hansen to manage the corporation and sell its property, and these stockholders
cannot question such action. The sale was for an adequate and proper consideration. The stockholders cannot complain for a further reason that William L. Hansen has materially changed his position due to their
delay in bringing an action, and they cannot be heard
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to say they had no notic.e of the transaction because they
were required to have knowledge of the 1nethod in which
their corporation had been managed and its business
conducted for 25 years preceding the transaction in ques-

-·-

tion. There should have been no accounting, and the
accounting as made is completely wrong. Furthermore,
there still is no offer from these plaintiffs to do equity.
They have been allowed to harass and embarrass and
annoy the defendant when they had nothing to gain and
could gain nothing ultimately from this lawsuit. Had
they been required in the beginning to make a tender
to return to W. L. Hansen what the corporation had re-

__:

ceived from him, the lawsuit would have ended at that
time. This whole proceeding was erroneous, inequitable,
in violation of all the applicable principles of equity.
The judgment should be reversed, and the trial court
should be directed to find for the defendant, William L.
Hansen, that the deed is valid and binding. The trial
eourt should also be directed to reinstate W. V. Jensen
and Mrs. J. E. Jensen as plaintiffs in order that they
may be liable for the defendant's costs in this case. The
trial court gave no judgment against Nephi Hansen so
there is nothing to consider so far as he is concerned.
The trial court gave

jud~ent

in favor of the Granite

Holding Company which it vigorously opposed so there
is no reason to hold the Granite Holding Company for
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costs. Costs should be awarded against these plaintiffs,
and W. V. Jensen and Mrs. J. E. Jensen.
Respectfully submitted,
SHIRLEY P. JONES,
Attoroey

f~or

Wrill~am

defe-ndiant,
L. Uansen

NOTE
Since there was judgment in favor of the Granite
Holding Company and no judgment against Nephi Hansen, those parties have submitted no briefs, but they
both insist that the judgment of the trial court was
wrong in the particulars and for the reasons specified
in the foregoing brief.

E. W. CLYDE
AttO'rneys for Gram;it.e Holding Co.
~
·v

RAWLINGS, WALLACE & BLACK ;}
~
Attorneys for N ep,hi J. Hams en
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